Control and disposal of demonstratives, with electrophysiological evidence from English and Japanese by Stevens, James Michael
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
Control and disposal of demonstratives,  
with electrophysiological evidence from English and Japanese 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION  
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF  
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA 
BY 
 
 
 
 
James M. Stevens 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
Jeanette K. Gundel, Yang Zhang 
 
 
 
 
June, 2014  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© James M. Stevens, 2014
   i 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Foremost among my acknowledgements are to my advisors, Professors Jeanette K. 
Gundel and Yang Zhang. Dr. Gundel provided the willingness to engage my curiosity, 
however unformed, and the guidance through original scholarship and professional 
development. Thank you for the never-ending conversations, Jeanette. To Dr. Zhang I 
owe the prize of completing the research that lies at the heart of the dissertation, as 
without his very kind patience, expertise, and resources, most of what follows would 
have remained sketches in a notebook. Thank you, Yang, for being a mentor in the finest 
sense. Thank you, too, Professors Sera and Kac, who have both been a consistent and 
encouraging presence as teachers and guides. I would also like to acknowledge the 
invaluable assistance of Tess Koerner, Sharon Miller, and Edward Carney. I would also 
like to recognize various funding sources that allowed for the present work to happen, 
including University of Minnesota start-up funds to Professor Zhang and funding from 
the University of Minnesota Linguistics Program, College of Liberal Arts, the FLAS 
Scholarship, and the Instructional Technology Fellowship. 
 
 
   ii 
 
Dedication 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my partner in this life, Candance, as very little of what I have 
done or become would be so without her support, love, patience, and this and that. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A signal is a means by which one animal makes use of another animal’s muscle power. 
-Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene 
 
 
 
Whatever exists has already been named, 
and what humanity is has been known; 
no one can contend 
with someone who is stronger. 
The more the words, 
the less the meaning, 
and how does that profit anyone? 
-Ecclesiastes 6:10-11 
 
   iii 
 
Abstract 
Demonstratives are lexical forms that pick out an object by making use of 
constraints in a discourse context to establish some form of contrast. They represent 
among the most basic uses of language, yet escape simple definition. The two forms 
“this” and “that” in English, the three forms こ “ko,” そ “so,” あ “a” in Japanese, etc. 
have traditionally been interpreted in terms of relative distance from the speaker or hearer 
to the object. An alternative framework presents demonstratives as a device to refocus 
attention (e.g., Strauss, 2002), where “this” requires more of the hearer’s attention, to 
represent new information, or to refer to objects relatively important in the discourse, 
versus objects called “that” or “it”. However, distance or attention alone is an insufficient 
parameter to predict form selection. This dissertation builds upon Brovold and Grush’s 
(2012) analysis of demonstratives in terms of control over an object. I propose that 
demonstrative forms, at least in English and Japanese, can be predicted from an array of 
control spaces that allow for varying levels of potential action toward an object. The 
proposed framework of control spaces implies an embodied view of language, such that 
language and physical behavior work toward shared goals and link mature human 
language use to other forms of animal communication, to child language acquisition, and 
with adult humans’ response to a changing environment (De Ruiter, 2006; Melinger & 
Levelt, 2005). 
The control space framework incorporates previous models and makes three 
specific predictions. First, relative distance serves as one determinant for demonstrative 
form selection. Second, the weight of relative distance in demonstrative form selection 
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will decrease without shared eye gaze between the speaker and hearer. 3. Demonstrative 
use would show as a tendency greater dependency on the co-speech pointing gesture for 
speakers of a language (e.g., English) that has fewer demonstrative terms than another 
(e.g., Japanese). To evaluate the three predictions, two perceptual studies that employed 
behavioral and event-related potential (ERP) measures were conducted to assess language 
users’ intuitions and cortical-level neural responses to the presentation of demonstrative 
expressions in differing visual contexts. When the simultaneous visual context with 
demonstrative expressions did not correspond with expected relative distances among 
speaker, hearer, and object, participants responded with significantly longer reaction 
times accompanied by a brain response called the N400, which is associated with 
semantic/contextual incongruities (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980, 1984). The elicitation of the 
N400 response for the incongruent audiovisual matchup in demonstrative use depended 
on shared gaze between the speaker and hearer, and the N400 responses were found in 
both English and Japanese subjects. English and Japanese subjects, however, differed in 
their responses to trials that did not include a pointing gesture in the visual scenes. In the 
absence of co-speech pointing gesture, English speakers expressed a P600 response, an 
index of pattern violations, but Japanese speakers did not. These findings indicate that in 
addition to spatial distance, language users rely on shared gaze in determining the proper 
use of demonstrative forms and show language-specific sensitivity to the presence or 
absence of gesture when analyzing demonstratives. 
The results of this dissertation project highlight the contingent, contrastive, and 
attention-orienting nature of demonstratives and further illustrate the necessity to study 
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speech communication as a multimodal social event, which is subject to a number of 
factors, including perspectives of the speaker and listener, physical context, gesture, and 
language per se. Demonstratives function as basic lexical means to make meaning out of 
the world. They represent a special case of names, which are interpreted here as deictic 
means to form an object out of a nameless ground. Demonstratives, more specifically, 
serve as names that are used once and then no longer refer to the same object, resuming 
the naming practice with every use. The ERP results reported in this dissertation show 
promising brain signature markers for understanding the multimodal processing nature of 
spatial demonstratives. Further directions for research are suggested, including measuring 
the relationship between autistic individuals’ competence with demonstratives alongside 
their imitative physical skills. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Demonstratives in space 
 
1.1. Introduction. 
The study of language holds particular fascination in its apparent unique place among 
humans and invites further questions about the nature of cognition itself. Several authors 
have discussed the role of language among a set of tools to simplify a search space 
(Bowerman, 1996; Clark, 1997; Demuynck, Duchateau, Van Compernolle, & Wambacq, 
2000; Hollich et al., 2000; Sperber & Wilson, 2005). Two broad and complementary 
means of constraining a search space are description and demonstration. Language can 
identify a referent by description, which is essentially a reconstruction of previous 
demonstrations. “The first U.S. President born in Hawaii” helps narrow a search in our 
world to a single entity by description without additional cues. Conversely, the 
expression “the senator over there” is in itself insufficient to identify a referent. In order 
to understand which senator is of interest, we expect in addition to this under-specified 
description such additional physical cues as a pointing gesture, the direction of the 
speaker’s gaze, and the relative distance between our conversation and the senators in the 
vicinity.  
 The physical constraints of demonstrative use have drawn considerable attention 
in fields as diverse as philosophy, linguistics, cognitive science, anthropology, and child 
psychology. In what follows, I will discuss demonstrative use in physiological and 
ritualistic terms. The physiological account will seek to describe what we do when 
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demonstratives are used. The ritualistic account will aim to describe what demonstratives 
do when they are used; this latter discussion will be saved until the final chapter. In that 
last chapter, I will develop a definition of demonstratives as single-use names, meaning 
that demonstratives have a naming function, by which one can identify an object with a 
symbol and afterward dispose with the name itself. The definition of demonstratives is 
difficult, as will be discussed in 1.2. 
 The bulk of this dissertation will describe demonstrative use in perceived space 
(exophoric usage). I will argue that a demonstration is an action-oriented behavior that 
expresses possibilities to interact with a referent. Specifically, I will posit that 
demonstrative use establishes a control space (cf. Brovold & Grush, 2012; Langacker, 
2002, 2009), space framed by physical and linguistic means that reflect the imagined 
action possibilities afforded to the interlocutors (cf. Gibson, 1977; Norman, 1988). A 
control space can be interpreted as having physical dimensions for material interaction, 
e.g., grasping a pencil, but can also be a non-material space formed through the use of 
pitch, syntax, memory, etc. I will also argue that control spaces can be ordered according 
to the level of control presumed possible by the speaker, and that the ordered control 
spaces are encoded by expected terms, e.g., in English, “this” for the first control space, 
“that” for the second. If, for instance, the speaker and hearer do not have the same 
vantage point and thus different capacities to interact with the environment, a space in 
which the speaker realizes more immediate possibilities for interaction with an object 
would be the first control space; a space where the hearer would have more immediate 
possibilities to interact with a referent would be the second control space. If the speaker 
and hearer have a shared point of view, then the possibilities for interacting with the 
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object would follow other considerations, such as the distance from both interlocutors. 
 Three hypotheses will be developed out of the use of control space to describe 
spatial demonstrative use.   
 
Hypothesis 1:  The properties of an individual language, such as the number of its 
demonstrative terms, will influence the expectation of physical constraints on a 
demonstration, such that language groups will differ in their responses to the 
presence or absence of a co-speech pointing gesture, among other forms of extra-
linguistic communication. Although humans universally have an interest in assessing 
means to control their environment, how they categorize the available action possibilities 
need not be universal, given the peculiarities of each language and the language group’s 
expected use of extra-linguistic tools. This hypothesis serves as an extrapolation from the 
Mutually Adaptive Modalities Hypothesis (De Ruiter, 2006; Melinger & Levelt, 2005), 
which predicts that language and gesture use will compensate for each other to maximize 
communication. The Mutually Adaptive Modalities hypothesis will be discussed in 
Chapter 2, but briefly put this hypothesis posits that more detailed verbal information 
lead to a decrease in gesture and vice versa. Although the hypothesis was formulated in 
terms of use within a given language, e.g., in the case of aphasia patients, a trend toward 
less reliance on extra-linguistic tools such as gesture in proportion to the richness of the 
demonstrative system may be observed across languages, although individual language 
groups (e.g., Italian) may be exceptional in the expectation for gesture. Hearers therefore 
can negotiate a search space with fewer physical cues to find a referent if the lexical 
information is sufficiently rich. 
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Hypothesis 2: Demonstrative use is sensitive to the relative distance of the referent 
to the speaker and hearer, since interlocutors will be able to interact differently with 
the referent based on the spatial context, and the role of relative distance as a 
determinant of demonstrative form. 
 Relative distance from the speaker to the referent object itself is a factor to which 
demonstrative form selection is sensitive, according to the Control Space Model, because 
the speaker will have more possibilities by which to control an object if that object is 
physically near the speaker, other variables being equal (e.g., one can otherwise imagine 
a near object hidden behind something else and thus less available for interaction). When 
the object is nearest the speaker, we will hypothesize a first control space that allows for 
a maximum amount of action possibilities for the speaker relative to other agents or 
distracter objects and therefore expect a correlated demonstrative form. 
A key part of this hypothesis is that in English the so-called proximal 
demonstrative form will correlate with an object that is near the speaker in relative terms. 
That is, an object might be found one meter from the speaker, a distance that might be 
considered small in terms of everyday human activities. However, if the object is sitting 
on the hearer’s lap, even an otherwise short distance such as one meter would be 
relatively longer compared to the distance of the object to the hearer. When in situation 
similar to a referent object lying on top of the hearer’s lap, the speaker would estimate 
having fewer action possibilities to interact with the object relatively to the hearer. In 
English, the expected demonstrative form in the latter context would be “that,” and in 
Japanese the expected form will be “so,” as the form correlates with the second control 
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space. 
 Not only could the delineation of a control space be determined relatively to the 
speaker and hearer but also compared to other objects. We can refer to a marsupial as 
“this marsupial,” to contrast to other pouched objects that are not in our focus and thus 
have fewer action possibilities associated with them. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Relative distance would exert less importance in the selection of a 
demonstrative form if the speaker and hearer do not have shared gaze, because the 
speaker’s ability to interact with the referent will be increased relatively to the 
hearer if the hearer is not attending in the same direction.. 
 It has been mentioned that relative distance alone cannot be the sole determining 
factor for demonstrative from selection. Hypothesis 3 focuses on one situation that differs 
from the use of distance to decide a demonstrative, as distance will be less important if 
the hearer is not aware of the referent object’s location. This hypothesis seeks to include 
situations where the hearer’s attention is redirected. For example, a speaker might refer to 
a book sitting next to the hearer, whose eyes are fixated on a TV screen, by saying, “Oh, 
what’s this book here?” The proximal demonstrative “this” may be considered acceptable 
despite the referent being nearer the hearer, as the speaker may consider more action 
possibilities toward the object than the hearer, who does not appear inclined to interact 
with the object spontaneously. The referent object therefore can still be considered within 
a first control space. 
 I will present two event-related potential (ERP) studies that use an audio-visual 
paradigm to test English or Japanese-speaking participants’ expectations for the pairing 
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of a demonstrative determiner (e.g., “that flamingo”) with the simultaneous presentation 
of a picture that includes the images of a speaker, a hearer, and a referent. The ERPs are a 
time-locked measure of voltage changes on the scalp in response to compared stimuli, 
and the present project analyzed these voltage changes by varying such parameters as 
demonstrative forms, relative distances between the speaker and hearer from the referent, 
the use of a pointing gesture, and the use of shared gaze.  The demonstrative forms 
presented in English were “this” and “that” and in Japanese were こ(“ko”), そ(“so”), and 
あ(“a”). One main finding was that in the English-speaking subject group an ERP 
response called the P600 was elicited when the pairing of a demonstrative form was 
unexpected by participants for a visual scene that did not include a pointing gesture, 
whereas no such effect was observed from the Japanese subject group for identical visual 
scenes. The P600 has been described as an index for pattern incongruities (Hagoort, 
Brown, & Groothusen, 1993; Hagoort, Brown, & Osterhout, 1999; Osterhout & 
Holcomb, 1992; Schlesewsky & Bornkessel, 2006; Van Herten, Chwilla, & Kolk, 2006). 
Another finding in both subject groups is that both reaction time data and ERP results 
showed participants’ sensitivity to relative distance as a factor in the expectation of a 
demonstrative form. A different ERP, the N400, was elicited by an unexpected pairing of 
a demonstrative form with a visual scene when the relative distance was varied. The 
N400 has been observed to indicate semantic violations in context (Brown & Hagoort, 
1993; Kutas & Federmeier, 2011; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980, 1984).  Participants in the 
present study in both subject groups showed sensitivity to the referent’s distance from 
both the speaker and the hearer. Notably, the N400 effect was not elicited when the 
speaker and hearer did not have shared gaze, irrespective of their relative distances to the 
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referent. More details on the ERP P600 and N400 responses, including literature review, 
method, results in the present investigation, and discussion, are provided in Chapters 3 
and 4. Modified versions of these two chapters have been peer reviewed and accepted for 
publication in the Journal of Neurolinguistics (Stevens & Zhang, 2013; Stevens & Zhang, 
2014).  
 
1.2. Demonstratives and the near and far problem.  
Diessel (1999) provided three criteria for demonstratives. Firstly, demonstratives are 
deictic expressions with specific syntactic roles. Deictic terms, similarly to 
demonstratives, escape simple definition, but for the time being we can consider them 
terms that require a point of reference to be meaningful. The words “I,” “yesterday,” 
“go,” and “here” all require reference to some aspect of the discourse context to be 
understood. The deictic features of demonstratives, according to Diessel’s cross-linguistic 
analysis, include the distance of the referent to a deictic center (that is, some point of 
reference, such as the speaker), whether or not the referent was visible, if it was uphill or 
downhill, and whether moving toward or away from the deictic center. The syntactic 
roles performed by demonstratives include that of independent pronouns (e.g., “this”), 
noun determiners (e.g., “this gym”), adverbs (e.g., “here”), and in some languages a non-
verbal copular use (e.g., in French, “Voici votre repas” = “Here’s your meal”). 
Demonstratives serve the pragmatic function of focusing another individual’s attention on 
some aspect of the speech situation, as well as to organize discourse information. The 
most basic function of demonstratives, according to Diessel, is “to orient the hearer 
outside of discourse in the surrounding situation” (p. 2). The last criterion is that 
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demonstratives be characterized by specific semantic features, such that a deictic contrast 
is established between the forms within a language.  Remarkably, Diessel’s survey of 85 
diverse languages found that all languages have a deictic contrast in their demonstrative 
forms, referring to entities that are near the deictic center versus some distance away 
from the center.   
Demonstratives are often described in terms of spatial distance from the speaker 
(Anderson & Keenan, 1985; Bain, 1879; Greenberg, 1985; Lyons, 1977; Wu, 2004). 
Lyons (1977) recognizes the egocentricity of deictic speech in English by describing the 
interpretation of language in relation to a canonical situation-of-utterance, which places 
the speaker at the zero point of spatial and temporal dimensions. Thrane (1980) 
formalizes deictic expression with the use of features [±proximal] to differentiate “this” 
versus “that”, [±space], and [±time] to describe demonstratives separately from the 
definite article. The notion of a distal form has been contested, as it suggests farther 
distance, yet what we call distal forms may be better considered associated with a hearer 
or in neutral space (Byron & Stoia, 2005; Enfield, 2003; Halliday & Hasan, 1979). Lyons 
takes “that” to be the unmarked form of the [±proximal] feature, rendering it more 
precisely a non-proximal form, which refers to that which is not close to the speaker but 
not necessarily far either. In fact, the difference between proximal and distal space might 
be considered neutralized, such that either form is possible, when a pointing gesture is 
present (Fillmore, 1971). These misgivings notwithstanding, the proximal-distal 
distinction does explain an intuition illustrated by the oddness of the demonstrative “that” 
used in (1).   
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(1) [While tugging at the shirt one is wearing] What do you think of this/??that shirt I 
found in my parents’ basement? 
 
Per the relative acceptability of (1), one could posit that “this” does denote objects that 
are closer to the speaker, especially if in direct contact. Distal demonstratives, on the 
other hand, seem more appropriate for objects close to a hearer, e.g., (2), where the 
proximal demonstrative “this” produces a less natural reading (unless perhaps the speaker 
is grasping the hearer’s shirt) and could be judged to convey a derisive opinion. 
 
(2)   Is this/that the shirt you’re wearing to the interview?   
 
 The deictic distinction in (1) and (2), according to Diessel’s excellent survey of 
demonstrative systems, is far from unique. Indeed, a binary demonstrative system is the 
most frequently found among the world’s language. One can imagine, given the 
recurrence of this system across languages, an argument for a biological foundation for 
spatial distinctions in language (Langacker, 1987, 2009; Regier, 1996).  
An anatomical basis for a proximal-distal distinction could be forwarded on the 
basis of the human visual system (see Kemmerer, 1999, for an excellent review). An 
argument for anatomical categories of near and far space could be supported with 
evidence from brain-damaged patients showing spatial neglect, a neurological deficit 
whereby parts of the visual field cannot be consciously perceived (Cowey, Small, & Ellis, 
1999; Halligan & Marshall, 1991; Heilman, Watson, Valenstein, & Damasio, 1983). 
Some patients have been observed to have a form of proximal-distal neglect, whereby 
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near space can be consciously represented but the representation of far space is impaired 
or, conversely, far space can be represented with deficits in perceiving near space 
(Cowey, Small, & Ellis, 1994; Cowey et al., 1999; Halligan & Marshall, 1991). Based on 
these clinical findings, it could be hypothesized that the human brain divides up space 
into near and far domains analogously to how demonstratives seem to be used across 
languages with proximal and distal demonstrative terms. Kemmerer (1999) points out the 
studies of spatial neglect by Halligan and Marshall and Cowey, Small, and Ellis show 
considerable variability in patients’ assessment of near and far space. Consequently, near 
and far visual domains likely intersect gradually, rather than forming a rigid boundary. 
To this author’s knowledge, moreover, there have not been case reports of neglect 
patients with specific deficits in the use of demonstratives. One conclusion from studies 
of neglect that could guide our study of demonstratives is the simple observation that 
humans do divide up space into near and far domains (Farnè & Làdavas, 2002; Legrand, 
Brozzoli, Rossetti, & Farnè, 2007; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2002), a finding 
corroborated by non-human primate neuron stimulation studies (Iriki, Tanaka, & 
Iwamustongra, 1996) and experimental studies on healthy human subjects (Bjoertomt, 
Cowey, & Walsh, 2002; Gamberini, Seralgia, & Priftis, 2008). 
There has been empirical evidence to support a perceptually-based proximal-
distal division in language use (Coventry, Valdes, Castillo, & Guijarro-Fuentes, 2008; 
Stevens & Zhang, 2013). Coventry et al. found that the use of the proximal forms “this” 
in English and “este” in Spanish were highly correlated with the reach of one’s hand or 
the reach with a hand tool versus longer distances. It was also found that the choice of 
demonstrative form was affected by who last manipulated the object, such that “this” was 
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used more frequently if the experimental subject had been last to touch the object. The 
finding that the speaker last touching the referent can influence the choice of referential 
form is, interestingly, discussed as a means of ‘activating’ the object in the Givenness 
Hierarchy (Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993).  
Coventry et al. argue for a perceptual basis for the binary proximal-distal system 
but leave contrastive uses in extrapersonal space (e.g., “this galaxy” and “that galaxy”) 
left unexplained. A second problem with the authors’ conclusion is that the use of a hand 
tool permitted the use of the proximal forms “this” and “este” for more distant spaces 
than without a tool, a finding that argues against a perceptual basis for the proximal-distal 
distinction. The influence, furthermore, of who had been last to touch the referent also 
does not coincide well with a distance model for demonstrative form selection. However, 
the findings in the Coventry et al. paper would be consistent with the argument of control 
space, such that physical distance is a factor for form selection, but the speaker’s use of a 
pointing tool extends the domain of control. The observation that if the speaker was last 
to touch the referent the proximal form is selected supports the role of control in the 
choice of demonstrative form. 
Despite speakers’ intuition and any empirical evidence favoring a proximal-distal 
distinction, a description of demonstrative use primarily in terms of distance, e.g., 
[+proximal] as the denotation of “this” (cf. Lyons, 1977; Thrane, 1980), is overly 
simplistic. At least four reasons preclude a direct application of [±proximal] as the 
distinguishing feature between demonstrative forms. (i) Interlocutors typically make use 
of tools, including their bodies, which would be redundant if demonstrative forms 
denoted a [±proximal] value but in fact seem necessary for a felicitous demonstration. (ii) 
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Tool usage can facilitate a demonstrative form not licensed by spatial distance alone. (iii) 
One problem with using the [±proximal] feature is its vagueness. (iv) When 
demonstrative use does not correspond with physical distance, one can often evoke a 
metaphorical use to rescue some sense of distance, leading to the problem of ever 
knowing what is a literal and what is a metaphorical interpretation. In addition to the 
above concerns is the mentioned criticism that demonstratives can be used contrastively 
in extra-personal space, e.g., “this galaxy” (Kemmerer, 1999). 
(i) Spatial proximity does not typically serve as the sole predictor of 
demonstrative form but more frequently is accompanied by some extra-linguistic cues. 
There are situations where the referent is salient enough that no physical indication is 
necessary, e.g., “This planet is very hospitable to sad lives” can be stated without 
pointing to the planet underfoot. However, the absence of any physical indication during 
a demonstration can often be odd. If a feature such as [+proximal] could serve as the 
denotation of “this,” then a person with an ugly cat nestled behind her feet could look her 
listener in the eye, hands in her pockets, and refer felicitously to the animal snuggled 
against her heels as “this ugly cat.” The cat is undoubtedly physically proximal, even 
touching the speaker, but the demonstration seems odd without the use of a gesture or a 
gaze in the direction of the referent. The direction of the speaker’s gaze and the use of a 
pointing gesture would be redundant, if “this” denoted a proximal object.  
(ii) The use of one’s body or other tools can accompany a demonstrative form that 
would not be predicted by spatial proximity alone, as found in Coventry et al’s (2008) 
findings. Frequently, a pointing gesture or other behavior can serve to redirect the 
attention of one’s audience. When the speaker can appreciate a referent that is not 
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apparently in the hearer’s awareness, a proximal form can be felicitous irrespective of 
spatial distance. As an example, imagine two young sisters, Alice and Angie, standing 
next to a bed getting ready for a wonderful evening. Alice tells Angie to pick out an 
outfit. One outfit is hanging on the door some distance away, and another is lying next to 
them on the bed.  As Angie picks up the clothes lying on the bed, Alice expresses (3). 
 
(3) [Angie picks up the outfit on the bed.] 
Alice:  No, not that one in your hands! You’d really do better with this one 
hanging on the door [turning her head and waving an open palm toward the outfit 
hanging on the door]. 
 
In (3), a distant object is picked out with the use of “this” when the hearer was not 
looking in the same direction. Notably, the demonstration in (3) would likely fail without 
the extra-linguistic cue of a waving hand, nod, or a pointing finger.   
(iii) A concern with the use of a [±proximal] feature as the denotation of 
demonstrative forms is the vagueness of this feature. One common boundary between 
proximal and non-proximal space that has been discussed is that of one’s arm’s length, 
analogously to how neglect patients have discriminated near and far space (Kemmerer, 
1999). However, no such demarcation in space can suit the variety of uses for the 
demonstrative forms. If one, for example, parks a car in front of a house with a “For 
Sale” sign in front, it would be unremarkable to ask, “What do you think of this house?,” 
even though the house is beyond one’s physical reach. In addition to the uses of a so-
called proximal form for reference in extrapersonal space, there is an additional difficulty 
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of knowing how to define a [±proximal] feature in languages with richer demonstrative 
systems (e.g., Japanese with three forms: “ko,” “so,” and “a”).  
(iv) The metaphorical use of demonstratives raises a concern for proximity to 
serve as the distinguishing feature of demonstrative forms, because it would require the 
hearer to switch between literal and metaphorical interpretations without systematic 
guidance. The above house example, where the speaker asked about “this house” seems, 
to this author’s intuition, to suggest more openness to buying it than the more apparently 
neutral stance in asking, “What do you think of that house?” Such examples convey an 
attitude toward a referent in terms of what could be deemed emotional distance (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1974; Semino & Culpeper, 2002; Wu, 2004). In (4), the use of the 
non-proximal form “that” is appropriate to communicate the speaker’s emotional stance 
toward the referent. 
 
(4)  Yuck! What is that? [shaking a bug off one’s sleeve] 
 
One can similarly ask “What is that?” when holding up a foot to examine a stain on one’s 
shoe. The use of “this” in either context would also be acceptable, but the availability of 
the distal form as a choice argues against distance as a unique determinant of 
demonstrative form selection. Interestingly, both contexts involve some displeasure on 
the part of the speaker, and this recognition would reasonably encourage separation from 
the source of displeasure. Although superficially the use of distance as the principal 
determinant of demonstrative forms seems to be rescued, the allowance of both literal and 
metaphorical interpretations of distance at random leads to the concern of never possibly 
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being wrong. In (5), for instance, the proximal form “this” works despite the speaker 
being farther from the referent than the hearer. 
 
 (5) [Son puts hand on car in garage] 
Father: [standing behind son and farther from the car]: Someday, this can be 
yours. 
 
It is inviting to invoke a metaphorical sense in which the father in (5) is still somehow 
close to the car:  because it is his property, because he is assuming the point of view of 
his son and is therefore vicariously close to the car, etc. This reasoning serves as a safety 
net for the distance model, such that any violation of the model can be construed as 
metaphorically close or distant from something. The ability to switch between literal and 
metaphorical interpretations ad hoc jeopardizes the predictive value of our explanation.
 Given the above concerns with explaining demonstrative forms as denoting 
spatial distance from the speaker, other frameworks have been offered. In 1.3, we will 
examine the use of focus to differentiate English demonstrative use. In 1.4, we will 
discuss the role of control to explain the same phenomena. 
 
1.3. Attentional models. 
Another explanation for the different uses of demonstrative forms is the extent to which 
they demand attention. Peirce argued against treating demonstratives as indices because 
they are words and thus must maintain the same word meaning across uses and that this 
meaning for demonstratives is to “call attention to what is spoken of” (Fitzgerald, 1966: 
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59). Attentional models, framed in terms of “attention,” “focus,” or “deixis,” have been 
proposed for Dutch  (Kirsner & van Heuven, 1988; Kirsner, 1977), Afrikaans (Ponelis, 
1993), Swahili (Leonard, 1995), and forwarded by Diessel (2006), having extensively 
surveyed typologically-diverse languages. The Givenness Hierarchy (Gundel, Hedberg, 
and Zacharski, 1993) similarly presents a framework that makes use of attentional status 
but differs from the above discussion in its treatment of referring forms generally, 
including definite and indefinite articles, as well as non-demonstrative pronominal forms. 
According to the Givennness Hierarchy, demonstrative pronouns “this” and “that” and 
pronominal determiner “this N” are correlated with the ‘activated’ cognitive status, 
whereby an object was recently brought to attention and might be considered in the 
speaker and hearer’s short-term memory. The pronominal determiner “that N,” on the 
other hand would require a less restrictive mental state, requiring only that the referent be 
presumed familiar to the hearer. The Givenness Hierarchy therefore should be noted for 
its explicit estimation of the hearer’s cognitive state, including memory or attention, 
findings supported by corpus work in several languages and child language (Gundel & 
Johnson, 2013; Gundel, Ntelitheos, & Kowalsky, 2007). On the basis of extensive corpus 
work, Strauss (1993, 2002) describes demonstrative use in American English without the 
notion that “this” and “that” represent spatial terms. Strauss instead explains the 
difference between the English demonstrative forms in terms of gradient focus, and that 
demonstrative use can be better explained in terms of shared information between the 
speaker and hearer and the relative importance of a referent.  
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 Fig. 1.1. The gradient focus model (Strauss, 2002). 
 
In this model (Fig. 1.1), the demonstrative ‘this’ correlates with a HIGH FOCUS referent, 
‘that’ with a MEDIUM FOCUS referent, and ‘it’ with a LOW FOCUS member, together 
forming a gradation of focus, which translates to ‘the degree of attention the hearer 
should pay to the referent’ (Strauss, 2002, p.135).  
Strauss (2002) analyzed a 45,000 word corpus of spontaneously produced 
American English and found evidence against the traditional proximal-distal distinction 
and support for the model based on gradient focus. The number of tokens of the three 
target forms, ‘this,’ ‘that,’ and ‘it’ was 2076, but only 16% (333 tokens) of these were 
‘this.’ Strauss argues against the proximal-distal model based on the alleged oddness of 
referring so seldom to objects that are close to the speaker. This argument, however, 
ignores the possibility that ‘that’ is used to refer to objects in non-proximal space, that is, 
ones that may or may be far from the speaker. As the number of objects that are not close 
to the speaker would surpass those that are close, there is nothing about this argument 
that can be used to evaluate the appropriate use of referring forms.    
A second argument laid by Strauss against the traditional distance-based 
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distinction is that it represents a static model, in which the speaker forms the center and 
demonstrative choice follows from the referent’s ‘relative distance from the speaker as 
the governing factor over demonstrative choice, with no other factors appearing to come 
into play’ (p. 140). This claim is not so clear, as it is difficult to understand what ‘relative 
distance’ can mean if the only distance that matters is from the speaker to the referent. If 
the distance model does in fact only factor in how far a referent is from a speaker, then 
there would be no other distance by which this could be considered relative. 
Strauss observes that ‘this’ is often used, e.g., (6), when referring to an object 
with an accompanying physical gesture, e.g., pointing, raising object up, moving object 
toward hearer. 
 
(6) [History lecture, teacher: Koch] 
Koch:  Yeah. The border states—specifically [pulls down map] we’ve looked at 
this before, but which border states do you imagine he’d be particularly concerned 
about? Which two? What’s this state? [points to the area on the map] (p. 141) 
 
The form “this” is argued to be associated with new, non-shared information and is used 
to bring a referent into the consciousness of the hearer and, as evidenced by the use of 
physical gestures, is strongly associated with the “here and now”. What is not clear about 
this explanation is what “here” and “now” mean in this model, if not the rewording of a 
speaker-centered framework.  Another concern with the above explanation for ‘this’ is 
that counter-examples are available in which the speaker is attempting to bring a referent 
in the hearer’s consciousness and high focus, yet “this” is a less felicitous form than 
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“that,” presumably because of the nearness of the referent to hearer, e.g., (7).  
 
(7) [A is in the audience waiting for B to give a speech, who is standing visibly off-
stage. A calls B’s cell phone just before B goes on stage] 
B: Hello, B speaking. 
A: Why are you wearing a watch? It looks tacky. 
B. Well, Gil’s watch wasn’t working. 
A: I wasn’t talking about Gil’s watch. I’m talking about that/??this one you have 
on! 
 
The perceived relative acceptability of “that” in (7) would be consistent with the distance 
model but not the gradient focus model, as it should be felicitous and in fact preferred to 
use “this” to refer to the watch in question, a high-focus object. Of course, such 
acceptability decisions would be treated well with judgments accumulated from native 
speakers, but invented examples are useful at least to frame the discussion for the time 
being. 
 The availability of counter-examples to the gradient focus model is worrisome. In 
(8), an example comes from my own son, Elias, then four years old, when he was being 
put to bed. I had just turned off his bedroom light, as well as the light in my own 
bedroom. 
 
 (8) Papa, can you turn back on that light? 
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There was no doubt in my mind that he was asking for me to turn back on the light in my 
room. If he had asked that I turn back on “this light,” by contrast, I would expect for the 
light in his room to be the intended referent. To this author, there is no easy means to 
explain the recognition of a referent between the use of “this light” and “that light” in the 
context of (8) with the concept of focus or redirection of attention. The question was not 
embedded in a larger conversation from which one can track the focus in discourse. It 
makes no sense in this scenario to compare the importance of the intended referents, nor 
can one easily differentiate between them according to new information versus shared 
information.   
 The above examples cannot pretend to discredit a framework based on solid 
corpus research and across language families, but they do give caution to a claim that 
attention or focus alone can differentiate the expectations for demonstrative forms.   
 
1.4. The role of control in demonstrative form selection. 
Langacker (2002, 2009) proposed that the concept of a control cycle can be usefully 
applied to several domains of language use. A control cycle describes a process of an 
agent starting at a baseline relaxation stage, upon which some new entity presents itself 
and causes tension in the decision for how to deal with the new entity, and afterward acts 
to and possibly succeeds to bring the entity under control, allowing the agent to reenter 
the relaxation phase.   
The prototypical example is that of a cat and mouse. If a mouse were to wander 
into a cat’s vision, this would create tension, as the cat will very likely act on the sight of 
the mouse. It will pounce on the mouse, capturing, biting, and eating it, and thus release 
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tension with its new control. At the risk of taking the example too literally, this author’s 
initial objection to the presentation of the Control Cycle in this manner is that 
domesticated cats very often do not eat mice they catch but instead enjoy releasing a 
captive mouse only to recapture it. By relinquishing control and then attempting to regain 
it, an agent might therefore reevaluate its control in a changing world. According to this 
latter view of cats, the release of tension is more attractive than sustained control, in 
contrast to Langacker’s (2009) claim that living creatures act with the goal of achieving 
and maintaining control. Langacker offers several examples to show control as a goal 
throughout life. On a social level, we experience tension when meeting new people and 
feel more control after getting to know them. Material possessions provide a feeling of 
control over our environment. As commonsensical as such examples are, it is overly 
simplistic to claim any one objective among all living creatures. Much human behavior, 
moreover, challenges an argument that control is a general goal, including such risk-
taking behavior as recreational drugs and similar thrill seeking such as sky-diving. 
Brovold and Grush (2012) applied the concept of the control cycle to 
demonstrative reference. They argue from the claims that (i) people seek, gain, and 
eventually lose control of entities, whether in a physical, perceptual, social, or attentional 
context; (ii) interlocutors in proximity are aware of each other’s control relations; (iii) 
speakers are aware of the proclivities for various forms of control; and the knowledge of 
(i)-(iii) is the control profile of a speech situation, which can be defined as the “shared 
knowledge of all aspects of the control cycle, including:  which entities your interlocutor 
is not paying attention to, is less likely to be able to perceive or grasp, what they used to, 
but no longer own.”  
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 Brovold and Grush develop their model for demonstrative use on corpora from 
sniper teams and on-line gaming forums, and they argue that the reason why speakers 
often assume that demonstrative use depends on spatial distance is because distance 
simply correlates with an individual’s ability to control an object physically, perceptually, 
etc. The argument for language users employing demonstratives to reflect control 
relations, rather than spatial distinctions, is supported by examples where control, but not 
distance, can explain the expected use of a form. The authors offer an example from 
Italian, in which the so-called proximal demonstrative pronoun “questo” would be used 
in the utterance “Che cosa è questo?” (=“What is this?”) to refer to a small wound on the 
addressee’s back, of which the latter might not be aware. Although the referent is close to 
the hearer, in fact, is part of the hearer, it is felicitous to use the proximal form in this 
situation where the speaker and not the mildly-wounded hearer can perceive the referent. 
The authors mention that spatial distance initially might seem to explain the acceptability 
of referring to a wound on someone’s hand as “that” (or “quello” in Italian) when a few 
meters away from that person, but it is actually the speaker’s restricted means of 
controlling the referent from a distance that drives the demonstrative form selection. 
Even from a distance of a few meters “this” could be felicitous if the speaker could 
(nearly) touch the referent with a stick. A recent example from playing with my sons was 
watching my son, Oliver, mistakenly dig in the pocket of the pants I was wearing for a 
hidden toy, at which point I said with the goal of being unhelpful, “I wouldn’t look in that 
pocket.” Although the pocket was part of the clothing I was wearing and thus by any 
measure proximal, I used the so-called distal form to specify the pocket where my son 
was searching, while I did nothing. Alternatively, one can explain the above example 
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from Italian and the example with my son, Oliver, as cases where the referent was 
‘activated’ by the speaker, thus undermining any expected role for relative distance 
(Gundel et al., 1993). 
 Perceptual control can also influence form selection. Brovold and Grush give the 
example of asking someone looking at something inside a box not in the speaker’s view: 
“What’s that?” Although the speaker may have been equidistant from the box as the 
hearer, the speaker could not see the referent of interest and thus would not ask “What’s 
this?” If, however, the speaker sees something of interest inside the box and presumes the 
hearer cannot see it, it would be appropriate to say “Look at this” (or ask “What’s this?”), 
but not “Look at that.”  
 I propose a similarly expressed account of demonstratives, the form of which I 
propose can be predicted in English and Japanese from an ordered set of control spaces, 
spaces recognized according to some constraints (physical, linguistic, memory) and that 
allow for differing degrees of interaction with the referent. For what remains of this 
chapter, I will argue for how the concept of control spaces can explain demonstrative use 
in English and Japanese and, acknowledging the similarity to earlier control models, will 
try to highlight differences from Brovold and Grush’s (2012) framework; show how 
control spaces better handle examples that are problematic for other models; and lay out 
predictions based on the current proposal. 
 The argument given here for a language user’s negotiation of control spaces 
follows from a basic view of the function of language. A faithful representation of the 
world, according to this model, would be both excessive and uninteresting. It is argued 
here that the environment is processed according to the possibilities for interaction that 
   24 
 24
are appreciated:  to hold an object, to observe some behavior, to direct one’s audience 
toward something, to wait for an object to approach the speaker, etc. A similar view of 
interaction with the environment can be seen, for instance, in such fields as robotics 
(Brooks, 1990, 1991), developmental psychology (Thelen & Smith, 1994), visual 
processing (Gibson, 1979; Nöe & Thompson, 2004), and gesture studies (Iverson & 
Goldin-Meadow, 2005; McNeill, 1992). According to an embodied view, language serves 
to manipulate that interaction, such as in the planning or interpretation. 
 The notion of control spaces is intended to avoid the binary categories of in-
control versus not-in-control suggested by the control cycle (Langacker, 2002, 2009). 
Structures that may be physical, social, linguistic, or of other material are thought to 
constrain a “space,” with which the interlocutors perceive or imagine some potential 
interaction. When referring to a physically-appreciated entity, the control space can be 
constrained by touching the referent, pointing at it, looking at it, or affecting it by other 
means. Although I will refer to control spaces as countable spaces that represent the 
action possibilities between an agent and an entity, when the relationships of many 
entities are considered simultaneously, we could envision the intersecting action 
possibilities as a control field, to account for the universal phenomenon of the control 
space between one agent and some entity affecting the control space between another 
agent and that entity and possibly even for the emergence of a group effect. 
Control spaces are to be compared with each other on the estimated possibilities 
for interacting with an entity in relation both to interlocutors present and alternative 
referents. A minimal level of interaction could be considered one’s distance to the entity. 
Other affordances would be signaled by the use of eye gaze, a pointing gesture, and 
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touching or handling an object. Language and speech structures can also suggest degrees 
of possible interaction with the use of syntactic position, phonological or morphological 
stress, among other possibilities. The ranking of the control spaces constrained by the 
above behaviors will be treated empirically. 
 Of note, the action possibilities are imagined and may vary in their realism. For 
instance, if someone sees a get-away car speeding off, the action possibilities in reality 
might be limited, and the speaker might lament the impossibility of catching up with the 
car. An acknowledgement of the difficulty achieving that goal is only meaningful 
because the speaker can imagine an alternative scenario where she does catch up with 
car. For this reason, a car speeding away would likely be identified as “that car,” rather 
than “this car,” as “this car” suggests an imagined control space whereby the speaker 
could entertain the possibility of controlling the car more than is currently realistic.  
 The use of a demonstrative suggests more one control space. The selection of a 
form in some languages, such as English, depends on a ranking of the control spaces by 
their estimated action possibilities. The action possibilities may differ between a speaker 
and audience. If a woman picks up a telescope with her hands, we would rank her control 
space regarding it as a referent higher than that of a man watching her hold the telescope. 
The highest ranked control space will be the one for which the speaker appreciates the 
most action possibilities for herself (i.e. the first or 1’ control space) in relation to that 
entity. The 2’ control space will be the next highest ranked for action possibilities for the 
speaker and will often be the highest ranked control space for another agent, such as the 
hearer. The highest control space for the hearer is thus also a control space for the 
speaker, considering affordances indirectly available to the speaker through the hearer, 
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but an inferior one to imagined action possibilities available directly to the speaker. The 
3’ control space, the next highest ranked, might be recognized between another agent not 
in the present discourse and the referent or simply between a noticeable landmark and the 
referent.  In more complex demonstrative systems, the ordered array of control spaces 
could be expanded into a matrix, such that arrays could be ranked by other criteria to 
indicate the affordances to the interlocutors than the speaker’s personal control. For 
example, in several languages spoken in mountainous regions (e.g., Lahu, Khasi, Byansi 
in the Himalaya, Lezgian in the Caucasus), the referent’s vertical position (down, up) 
would suggest separate possibilities (Diessel, 1999). 
The proposed framework describes form selection on the basis of action 
possibilities, rather than actual control. The example of a man handcuffed behind his 
back is a rare scenario in which the speaker could be physically touching the referent and 
yet, in addressing his liberator, use either the so-called distal form by saying:  “Would 
you unlock that?” in recognition of his inability to free himself or “Would you unlock 
this?” in response to the illusion of control by touching an object. Imagined action, rather 
than actual control over an object, therefore drives the ranking of control spaces.   
As the control spaces, in their simplest case, can be ordered according to the level 
of control possible or imagined by the speaker, the control spaces can be encoded by 
expected terms according to their rank order, e.g., in English, “this” for the first control 
space, “that” for the second. For Japanese, “ko” would be applied to the first control 
space, “so” to the second, and “a” to the third.   
We can now consider how demonstrative forms in each language match up with 
various spatial configurations as an illustration of the use of control spaces to describe 
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demonstrations, Fig. 1.2. Fig. 1.2 includes a man who is speaking to a woman about a 
flamingo. The rows are to be read as including only one flamingo at a time, to be chosen 
from one of the dotted cells. 
 
a. 
 3°         2°   1°           
 
b. 
 3°  2°  1°            
 
c. 
3°  2°  1°                                                     
 
d. 
3°  2°  1°                                                       
 
e. 
3°  2°  1°  
 
f. 
3°  2°    
1°  
Fig 1.2.  Schemata for control spaces secondary to discourse configurations  
 
In Fig. 1.2a, the speaker and hearer have shared gaze, and neither is able to touch 
a referent from their position. The only way to decide the control space of the speaker is 
to evaluate his relative distance to the referent. The flamingo nearest the speaker lies 
  1° 
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within the highest-ranked control space. The flamingo nearest the hearer lies in his 
second highest-ranked control space. A flamingo beyond the speaker and hearer occupies 
a third highest-ranked control space. The first and second control spaces in Fig. 1.2a are 
meant to coincide with the findings in Coventry et al., (2008), as well as the intuition 
behind examples (1) and (2) above. We now can explain why the use of “this” in (2) 
sounds derisive, as it suggests the speaker is assuming control from the hearer regarding 
his own shirt. 
If the speaker and hearer face the same direction, (Fig. 1.2b), then the control 
spaces are divided according to distances from the speech context to indicate the relative 
difference in action possibilities presumed for an object. Thus, an object might be 
considered within the first control space if the speaker intends to approach it, and it might 
be considered within a lower ranked control space if the speaker means only to note the 
object or is dismissive, reflected in example (4) above, and does not intend much further 
interaction with it. Fig. 1.2b is intended to reflect the intuitive difference between asking, 
from the curbside, “What do you think of this house?” versus “What do you think of that 
house?” discussed above. Notably, if an entity is referred to with a form associated with a 
lower-ranked control space, such as in Fig 1.2b, this implies the existence of an imagined 
higher-ranked control space. Referring to a house neutrally as “that house” without the 
suggestion of further action implies another, more primary control space, where one 
could act upon the referent, e.g., sign a purchase agreement for a house. 
If the hearer is not attending in the same direction as the speaker, (Fig. 1.2c) and 
(Fig. 1.2d), then the speaker might extend the primary control space up to the hearer, as 
the interlocutors’ relative distances to the referent will matter less if the hearer is not 
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aware of the referent’s location and thus cannot act upon it. A referent within the hearer’s 
gaze would be in the secondary control space, and referents outside the hearer’s 
proximity or gaze would be in a more remote, tertiary control space. Fig. 1.2c is intended 
as an analogy to Brovold and Grush’s (2012) example of touching a wound on the 
hearer’s back, yet within the speaker’s control space due to the speaker’s instrumentation 
of the wound with a stick. Fig. 1.2c also reflects the intuition in example (3), where a 
redirection of the hearer’s attention negates the importance of physical distance. Fig. 1.2d 
illustrates also how one can point out a very distant object, e.g., “this galaxy!,” and still 
treat it in the primary control space, because of the hearer’s attention being elsewhere. 
Example (6) also involves a redirection of attention and is schematized in Fig. 1.2c and 
Fig. 1.2d. 
The extension of the primary control space to a hearer attending elsewhere does 
not seem to work as well if the hearer blocks the path, with the exception of the speaker 
creating a path toward the referent. If the hearer lies between the speaker and referent, 
then the object will typically either fall in the secondary control space or lower, Fig. 1.2e.  
Fig. 1.2e also is meant to schematize the control spaces motivating the use of “that” to 
bring the hearer’s attention to his own watch or a nearby lamp in (7) and (8). A situation 
can be imagined in which one uses “this” to refer an object behind the hearer. Imagine a 
shopkeeper at a bookstore pointing a finger and saying, “This is what you’re looking for,” 
referring to a book behind the shopper. According to this author’s intuition, the use of the 
proximal form in this example suggests that the shopper is somehow transparent to the 
shopkeeper, who, due to familiarity with the store, can “see” the book even with a 
person’s body in the way. As Fig. 1.2f depicts, physical distance is not the only criterion 
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to judge control space. If the speaker sees a path for himself toward a referent object 
behind the hearer, then the object could be assessed with higher action possibilities for 
the speaker than the hearer. An example from my own house is when my son asked me 
for “that book over there” from the comfort of his bed. When I did not know which one 
he had in mind, he said, with a huff, “this book over here,” as he got up to fetch it 
himself. 
Fig. 1.2f is intended to show how even an object can be included in the speaker’s 
primary control space, despite the hearer’s relative nearness to the object, to reflect other 
means of controlling an object that are not physically apparent. In the case of the father 
owning a car that is nearer the son in (5), there is a bond between the owner and father 
that the interlocutors can appreciate that is not material. Societal connections are very 
meaningfully represented through our language choices, even though they are not 
available directly to our senses. 
The demonstrative forms in English and Japanese are posited here to be 
associated with the control spaces schematized in Fig. 1.2 and listed in Table 1.1. 
 1° 2° 3° 
Japanese こ “ko  そ “so”  あ “a” 
English this that That 
                 Table 1.1. Demonstrative forms and associated control spaces 
 
The various configurations of control space in Fig. 1.2 suggest many hypotheses, 
but this dissertation will be limited to three hypotheses, in order to separate the control 
space description of demonstratives from that of a distance model and attentional models. 
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As stated above, Hypothesis 1 is that users of separate languages will depend on extra-
linguistic information, such as a pointing gesture, differently. Table 1.1 indicates that 
English does not differentiate the secondary and tertiary control spaces lexically, whereas 
Japanese uses the morphemes “so” and “a” for contexts comparable to when English 
speakers use “that.” Considering that Japanese employs more lexical means with which 
to constrain a control space, it is possible that English speakers will rely more on pointing 
gestures to restrict search space. This prediction would relate to the Mutually Adaptive 
Modalities Hypothesis (De Ruiter, 2006; Melinger & Levelt, 2005), discussed in Chapter 
2, which predicts that gestures will supplement lexical communication in language-
specific ways. Hypothesis 2 expects for spatial distance to affect demonstrative form, 
because spatial distance will correlate highly with action possibilities. Per Hypothesis 3, 
if the hearer is attending elsewhere than the area of the referent, then spatial distance 
should matter less, given the speaker’s greater affordances with the referent without the 
hearer’s attention. Table 1.2 separates the Control Space description from the distance 
and attentional models according to the three hypotheses, as they were presented in 
Sections 1.2 and 1.3 (thus, the Gradient Focus model will serve as the example of an 
attentional model). 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 
Distance model 
 
 
 
Attentional models 
  
 
Control space 
   
Table 1.2. The hypotheses and their fit among demonstrative descriptions. 
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We can see therefore that demonstratives have been treated in quite different ways 
by various theorists:  as markers of distance, cues for attention and focus, correlates of 
the estimated cognitive state of the hearer, as well as the level of control between the 
speaker and object. In what follows in Chapter 2, I will discuss evidence from 
primatology and clinical and gesture studies to support the argument for control spaces as 
a viable description for how humans demonstrate in space. In Chapters 3 and 4, I will 
introduce behavioral and electrophysiological data to support the predictions from the 
Control Space framework. The advantage of using behavioral data is that we will have 
indices, such as reaction time, for the ease of cognitive processing. The event-related 
potential paradigm is used because it can offer detailed information regarding the 
temporal progression of violation detection, broad localization techniques on the basis of 
scalp topography, comparisons with other studies of semantic and pragmatic anomalies, 
and can be used to corroborate data obtained by other techniques. The ERP technique is 
thus important for its measurement of brain electrical activity to provide data that are not 
available by behavioral data alone and can serve as a preliminary study of how the brain 
processes referential language use in space. In Chapter 3, I will discuss an ERP study that 
offers evidence both for spatial distance as a factor in demonstrative selection 
(Hypothesis 2) and that spatial distance will be a less important factor if the speaker and 
hearer do not have a shared gaze (Hypothesis 3) (Stevens & Zhang, 2013). In Chapter 4, I 
will discuss an ERP study (Stevens & Zhang, 2014) that provides support for the view 
that reliance on a pointing gesture depends on the specific language (Hypothesis 1). In 
Chapter 5, I will review the findings discussed thus far in light of further possible 
investigation, such as in the contexts of autism and schizophrenia, and will provide a 
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preliminary description of demonstratives as single-use names (or disposable names). 
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Chapter 2: Overview of gesture 
From the forest to the crib to the din of the factory 
 
2.1. Introduction. 
The topic of demonstratives attracts theorists and researchers from a broad range of 
disciplines partly because demonstratives seem so primitive. This impression is 
reinforced by the co-occurrence of gesture with demonstratives, as gesture itself seems 
like a predecessor toward full-fledged symbolic language. In Chapter 1, we introduced 
the concept of control spaces as physical or metaphorical dimensions by which available 
actions toward a referent are assessed by the speaker. By this view, when using a 
demonstrative, we encode a basic categorization of possible interaction. 
 To evaluate the concept of control spaces, it will be helpful to review how gesture 
has been analyzed across species and developmentally. As discussed below, gesture and 
language appear to develop to influence one’s environment. Both in non-human apes and 
among children, control of an object will drive communicative tools in various forms. 
The discussion to follow takes the view that demonstratives are closely associated with 
gesture use, but alternative viewpoints exist, such that demonstratives are considered 
primarily as terms correlated with mental states and secondarily terms employed in 
physical space (Gundel et al, 1993). 
 
2.2. Gestures among non-human primates. 
Gestures often resemble the expected actions that motivate their use (Arbib, 2002; 
Armstrong & Wilcox, 2007; King, 2004; Perlman, Tanner, & King, 2012; Tanner & 
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Byrne, 1996). Call and Tomasello (2007) have studied the use of gestures among great 
apes in indicating such potential behaviors as grooming, play, dominance, nursing, and 
sex that require social negotiation and found similarities between the sign and the 
potential action. Whereas non-human primates seem to have a fixed number of 
vocalizations, their gestures seem to be individually learned and flexible with their usage 
(Pika, Liebal, & Tomasello, 2003; Tomasello, George, Kruger, Farrar, & Evans, 1985). 
In studying captive apes, Savage-Rumbaugh and colleagues (1986) observed pygmy 
chimpanzees making twisting motions to request another to open a lid or a hitting motion 
to encourage another to crack nuts. The repertoire of non-human ape communication is 
far more restricted than humans, not only due to the lack of verbal language in the former 
but also in the expression of imaginative scenarios. Tomasello (2008) argued against non-
human primates’ capacity for iconic gesture, arguing that this presupposes a sophisticated 
theory of mind. He offers the example of the human gesture for sprinkling (invisible) 
cheese, a task unlikely to be observed among other apes, as a counterpoint to any view 
extending imitative human gesture use to other apes. Rather than delineate the capacity of 
one species from others so categorically, another approach would argue for a spectrum of 
simulative complexity, such that humans could entertain more abstraction than other 
species that may ground gesture more closely to the intended action (Perlman et al., 
2012).   
 The pointing gesture is one that occurs spontaneously among humans but does not 
occur consistently among other apes in their natural environment (Racine, 2012). 
Although captive apes do point (Leavens, Hopkins, & Bard, 1996; Leavens, Hopkins, & 
Thomas, 2004), there is controversy what this behavior really means and how it relates to 
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what humans do (Tomasello, 2006, 2008) and if chimpanzees could possibly have the 
social-cognitive abilities required to point at an object for the sake of an audience 
(Povinelli & Vonk, 2003). Chimpanzees have been observed to point to food out of reach 
and, unlike the typical use of the index finger among humans, have been seen to point 
with the whole hand (Call & Tomasello, 1994; Wilkins, 2003) and feet (Woodruff & 
Premack, 1979) and use lip pointing as is done in some human societies (Enfield, 2001, 
2003). Because chimpanzee pointing often targets food, it could be tempting to call this 
“reaching,” rather than pointing, but Leavens et al. (Leavens et al., 1996, 2004; Leavens, 
Russell, & Hopkins, 2005) have noted that this behavior does not occur when the 
chimpanzee is alone. Similar behavior has been observed among other captive apes, 
including bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans (Leavens & Hopkins, 1999), as well as 
monkeys in captivity (Blaschke & Ettlinger, 1987; Hess, Novak, & Povinelli, 1993; 
Kumashiro, Ishibashi, Itakura, & Iriki, 2002) and even dolphins (Xitco, Gory, & Kuczaj, 
2001). It would be easy to discount behaviors among captive animals as uninformative by 
challenging the ecological validity of this observation, but this line of reasoning could be 
leveled equally against any descriptions of urban human beings (Leavens et al., 2005). 
Wild bonobos were once observed to point at human observers attempting to hide nearby 
(Véa & Sabater-Pi, 1998), wild non-human apes do not point with the same frequency as 
captive ones.   
However, it should be noted that non-human primates do use gesture abundantly 
in the wild, just not to pick out a referent. For instance, male chimpanzees might indicate 
their sexual intentions towards females with body movements, rather than vocalization, 
so as to avoid signaling their interest to competing males (Hobaiter & Byrne, 2012). 
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Tomasello and colleagues have observed the use of raised arms to indicate an interest in 
play and poking behavior to get attention (Tomasello et al., 1997; Tomasello, Call, 
Nagell, Olguin, & Carpenter, 1994). The close association between the social intention 
and the communicative gesture among gorillas was catalogued by Tanner and Byrne 
(1996), such that gorillas used gestures that, to a human observer’s eyes, demonstrate the 
actions they wanted other individuals to perform. Chimpanzees likewise can be argued to 
use two types of intentional gestures:  “incipient actions” transformed into gesture 
through ritualistic use and “attractors” (Pika, Liebal, Call, & Tomasello, 2005). Incipient 
actions include, for example, a young chimpanzee that touches her mother’s rear-end to 
signal that her mother lower her back to climb on. An example of an attractor would be 
males’ use of leaf-clipping, whereby they make noises to attract the attention of females 
for sexual behavior.  
There is no straightforward explanation for why apes raised in captivity point but 
ones in the wild typically do not, but a possibility is that the physical restraints of 
captivity lead to the spontaneous use of pointing in both chimpanzees and humans 
because of recognition of a referential problem space, “a set of related circumstances in 
which barriers exist to direct attainment of goals and therefore indirect means to attain 
those goals must be discovered or recalled then effectively applied” (Leavens et al., 2005, 
p.188). Whether one is chimpanzee or human, the use of pointing, therefore, can be 
thought of as an epigenetic strategy to interact socially with one’s surroundings, initially 
with the basic goal of obtaining an object with the aid of another agent. Rather than 
depending on one’s own body directly for a solution, a physically-restricted agent can 
exploit a referential triangle, including the sign, the referent, and the intended audience, 
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to achieve a goal that would be either impossible or laborious through one’s own effort 
(Butterworth, 2003; Leavens et al., 2005).   
 
2.3. Gesture among human language learners. 
The concept of non-human primates performing a referential gesture has been challenged 
on the basis of the complex social-cognitive abilities involved, although one-year old 
humans also point and understand pointing, without the supposedly necessary social-
cognitive abilities, seen at least two years later  (Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005; 
Camaioni, Perucchini, Bellagamba, & Colonnesi, 2004; Liszkowski, 2006; Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001). Liszkowski (2006) mentions that human pointing may differ 
categorically from pointing in other species ontogenetically, such that it has been argued 
that human pointing is associated with symbol use (Werner & Kaplan, 1963) and 
language acquisition (Goldin-Meadow & Butcher, 2003; Wilkins, 2003). Pointing among 
humans shows a similar manipulation of shared attention, although the form of pointing 
varies across cultures, including the use of a finger, a whole hand, or a lip pointing 
(Wilkins, 2003). No matter the phenotype, Butterworth (2003) considered gestures 
always involve a learned association combining the signaler, an audience, and an object.  
What has been referred to as deictic or referential gesture may form an important 
transition between non-symbolic and symbolic representation. Tomasello (2003) 
categorizes infant gestures into ritualistic, deictic, and symbolic:  the first of which is not 
symbolic, the third is symbolic, and the second forms an intermediate form. Ritualistic 
gestures are ones that infants perform to stimulate a response, such as lifting their arms to 
get picked up, and Tomasello links such gestures with primate gesture use. Deictic 
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gesture use differs importantly from ritualistic use, according to Tomasello, in its 
formation of a triad of signaler, interactant, and some other entity of some presumed 
attentional value, whereas ritualistic gestures involve only the signaler and interact. 
Tomasello’s formulation applies a division between procedural gesture and attention-
directing ones, but one may understand ritualistic gestures such as “arms up” as a means 
to redirect the interactant’s attention to the signaler’s own body as a third object.    
 As with non-human primates, there exists a degree of speculation in describing an 
infant’s intention when pointing. Bates, Camaioni, and Volterra (1975) described an 
infant communication as following a development along three stages, following Austin’s 
(1962) speech act theory: a perlocutionary stage, an illocutionary stage, and a locutionary 
stage. The communication at the perlocutionary stage would involve leading to some 
result as a by-product of the communication. At the illocutionary stage, communication is 
used with the intention to lead to some result. At the locutionary stage, communication 
serves to makes statements without an explicit intended result. Bates et al. argue that 
infant pointing is at the illocutionary stage, such that it expresses an intention, but in later 
work it was argued that babies use both proto-imperative pointing and proto-declarative 
pointing (Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1979). As the names 
suggest, proto-imperative pointing is used to indicate something that the baby wants 
done, and proto-declarative pointing serves to focus the audience’s attention on some 
interesting state of affairs.   
 Imperative pointing and declarative pointing have been treated as distinct 
behaviors that require different cognitive prerequisites. Imperative pointing, that is, 
indicating one’s want with gesture, has been treated as a sort of ritualized failure to reach 
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an object (Vygotsy, 1978), but pointing and reaching for an object have been shown to be 
unrelated developmentally (Masataka, 2003). Reaching and imperative pointing differ 
importantly in that, among mature users, pointing is performed only with another 
individual present and is therefore a social act, such that it manipulates another person’s 
body. Reaching, on the other hand, is a physical act that may be executed without 
consideration of others. When pointing declaratively, the agent is picking out an object to 
manipulate another person’s attention. This sort of pointing appears more sophisticated, 
in presupposing the user understanding the audience’s attention state. 
To support the view that declarative pointing requires more advanced cognitive 
abilities, it has been reported that non-human apes and autistic children do not point 
declaratively, although they do so imperatively (Liszkowski, 2006). The lack of 
declarative pointing in the second year of life serves as an essential diagnostic criterion 
for autism (Baron-Cohen, 1996). Declarative pointing, on a related note, seems to emerge 
in line with the emergence of productive language (Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 
1998). 
 The age that infants start pointing imperatively differs according to reports. 
Desrochers, Morissette, and Ricard (1995) mark such behavior as early as 15 month olds, 
who are sensitive to their audience’s gaze. Liszkowski (2006), however, provides 
evidence for 12 month olds pointing imperatively. Furthermore, infants have been found 
to point even when they are alone in a room, challenging the notion that pointing 
behavior depends on gaze recognition (Delgado, Gómez, & Sarriá, 1999). Moore and 
D’Entremont (2001) found that 12 month olds point repeatedly at an object without 
accounting for their audience’s gaze. Povinelli and O’Neil (2000) pose complications 
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with the distinction between imperative and declarative pointing, remarking that these 
pointing functions have been defined differently according to researcher in terms of 
gesture identification and whether alternating gaze accompanied the pointing. These 
authors raise the question of whether tracking of gaze follows a separate physiological 
system from pointing that cannot work as distinguishing feature of among pointing 
functions. 
 In light of reports that challenge a neat developmental model of gesture use, we 
should exercise caution in our interpretation of imperative and declarative pointing. 
Firstly, any talk of development of kinds of pointing suggests that the mature forms exist, 
but what we call ‘imperative’ and ‘declarative’ may be more conveniences based on 
prototypes than natural kinds. Examples from language are abundant, e.g., the declaration 
“There’s no salt” may be understood as an indirect imperative to provide salt. Even a 
more abstract declaration, such as “New Mexico has the highest number of Spanish 
speakers per capita for a U.S. state,” carries the expectation that the hearer begin to 
assume the speaker’s knowledge. In other words, any declaration S can be understood 
equivalently as an imperative “Know that S.” Interrogatives can be treated analogously. 
Referential pointing can similarly be thought to have an imperative quality, e.g., pointing 
at a couch in a furniture store carries the expectation that the hearer consider this, perhaps 
as a purchase. 
 If all behavior can be thought of as manipulation of one’s environment, all 
utterances and gestures can be treated as an imperative, commanding the audience to 
one’s attention. The development of referential pointing, eventually leading to words, 
shows a gradual release of control, as children begin making reference by showing an 
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object, transition to handing it over, and finally pointing (Volterra & Erting, 1990). As a 
human matures, language and gesture appear to operate from a common planning 
function (McNeill, 1992). Evidence for the common production system for gesture and 
language is found in mirror neurons, cells responsive to the observation of others 
performing an action, being activated in frontal-parietal areas when perceiving or 
performing both hand and mouth movements (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 
1996; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). 
 The ontogenetic transition toward less physically restricted forms of control in 
object reference is mirrored in language development. The use of deictic language is 
more prevalent than representational descriptions among young children, but this pattern 
reverses as language users mature (Pizzuto & Capobianco, 2005). Several studies have 
shown that referential gestures are the most prevalent among children 16-20 months of 
age, where the most commonly used gestures were used with words to name an object 
(e.g., saying “flower” while pointing at one) or comment on it (Caprici, Iverson, Pizzuto, 
& Volterra, 1996; Pizzuto, 2002; Volterra, Caselli, & Capirci, 2005). Even after children 
develop a more sophisticated lexicon and can express themselves with words only, they 
continue to point to pick out an object with their bodies (Rodrigo, Gonzalez, de Vega, 
Muneton-Ayala, & Rodriguez, 2004).  
 The progression of gesture and language use among young humans cannot be 
described in sure terms, as individual variation can easily upset a developmental model. 
However, gesture and language acquisition both can be viewed as the obtainment of skills 
to control one’s environment at a distance. Pointing among infants seems to emerge as a 
means to use one’s audience as a tool to satisfy an immediate desire and eventually 
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includes declarative or referential pointing as a strategy to manipulate the audience. As 
noted above, the act of reference itself reflects how the learner develops less direct ways 
to control their surroundings:  first by holding up the object of interest, then handing it 
over, and finally pointing at it (Volterra & Erting, 1990). The manipulation of one’s 
environment by recruitment of one’s audience seems to drive not only gesture 
development but also complements the view that a demonstration of an object includes an 
assessment of the action possibilities available with which to control it. 
 
2.4. Language and gesture among mature users. 
The relationship between gesture and language use is not yet clear, as it is possible that 
gesture serves to supplement concepts not expressed in language or that it accentuates 
concepts constrained by the possibilities set by language, among other possibilities. 
 One framework conceptualizes language and gesture as originating from a 
common productive source, and the structural constraints of a particular language will 
therefore affect how physical gesture occurs. By this view, syntactic and semantic 
structures of languages represent events in such a way that affects the use of co-speech 
gesture (Halliday & Hasan, 1979; Kita & Özyürek, 2003; Kita, 2000; Lyons, 1977; 
McNeill & Duncan, 2000; Özyürek, Kita, Allen, Furman, & Brown, 2005; Quirk, 1979). 
Theoretical arguments have emerged from this evidence that conclude that utterance 
generation includes an interaction of language and gesture, stated as the Interface 
Hypothesis (Kita & Özyürek, 2003) or Growth Point Theory (McNeill & Duncan, 2000).   
 McNeill and Duncan (2000) for instance, studied the use of gesture and speech in 
English and Spanish, languages that encode verbal actions differently for manner and 
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path. Manner is generally less explicitly expressed in Spanish than in English. The study 
presented English and Spanish speakers with excerpts from a Sylvester and Tweety 
cartoon that included motion events and found that Spanish speakers are more likely to 
express the manner of an event with a gesture, more so than in their speech, whereas 
English speakers expressed both manner and path in their speech and their gestures often 
downplayed the manner of action. The authors treat specific languages and gesture 
systems as modes of “thinking-for-speaking,” to which end gestures are considered 
“material carriers” that will take on language-specific forms. Gestures, in this view, are 
used more frequently when the context differs appreciably from the thought to be 
expressed, because the gesture will further contribute to the meaning. Gestures, in fact, 
have been observed to be used more elaborately when there are discontinuities or less 
predictable uses of speech (McNeill, 1992). 
 The Interface Hypothesis claims that the linguistic representation and the 
gestural/imagistic representation of an event interact during speech (Kita & Özyürek, 
2003). According to this hypothesis, when formulating one’s speech, gestures encode 
both the imagistic aspects of a representation and the conceptualization of an event. If 
some component of an event is not expressed in speech, it will not be expressed in 
gesture. If speakers of languages employ different syntactic frames to express a concept, 
then the gestures will accordingly. If a speaker’s language does not lexically encode a 
concept, then there will not be an analogous gesture. For example, English has a verb 
“swing” that has no equivalent in Japanese and Turkish, neither of which have a concise 
means to express movement along an arc. Kita and Özyürek (2003) found that Turkish 
and Japanese speakers were more likely to gesture a swinging concept with a straight 
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movement of the arm, whereas English speakers swung the arm along an arc trajectory. 
As a second experiment, the authors compared English, Turkish, and Japanese speakers’ 
expression of the path and manner of event. Japanese and Turkish do not have the 
capacity as English speakers to express manner and path in the same clause, e.g., “He 
rolled down the hill.” Japanese and Turkish speakers would instead express this concept 
by separating the manner and path, e.g., “He descended as he rolled.” In support of the 
Interface Hypothesis, it was found that Japanese and Turkish speakers were more like to 
make two gestures when expressing this concept, and English speakers used only one.     
 An alternative view to the Interface Hypothesis is the Mutually Adaptive 
Hypothesis (De Ruiter, 2006; Melinger & Levelt, 2005), which expects for gestures to 
complement speech in settings where speech is less effective, e.g., when there is loud 
ambient noise. Gesture is used less when speech is more effective, such as over the 
telephone.  Furthermore, speakers gesture less when their descriptions of an object are 
more detailed (Melinger & Levelt, 2005). The Mutually Adaptive Hypothesis was 
developed in the context of a single language, unlike the Interface Hypothesis, but one 
can extrapolate the Mutually Adaptive Hypothesis to predict a trend by which languages 
with more lexical means to constrain a search space require fewer extra-linguistic means. 
 The above hypotheses differ in how they explain the association of gesture with 
language, and it is admittedly quite difficult to understand how language and gesture are 
produced, but the frameworks of language and gesture production above all do describe 
language-specific gesture use. We expect for the parameters of a given language to 
influence gesture in a demonstration if we consider these communication systems as 
combinatory tools by which a space of action possibilities can be designated. It would be 
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useful to consider what the above hypotheses might suggest regarding the sensitivity of 
language users to a pointing gesture in correlation with the richness of that language’s 
demonstrative system. In the following two chapters, we will investigate how 
electrophysiological components in an EEG signal reflect language users’ intuitions 
regarding demonstrative use in space and with such expected parameters of a control 
space as gaze and gesture.  
 The subject population will include both native English and Japanese speakers. 
The questions of interest are whether the presentation of demonstratives in varying visual 
contexts will elicit a previously reported brain response or a new neurophysiological 
finding. One probable candidate response would be an N400, as this ERP had been 
observed following semantic or pragmatic challenges. It is not clear from previous N400 
studies if similar findings would occur with spatial demonstrative use. Another also is 
unclear from the literature is the role of the P600 ERP, the positive deflection at 
approximately 600 ms, regarding semantic processing. As there have not been ERP 
studies reported about demonstratives, it is moreover unknown how speakers of 
languages with different demonstrative systems would respond differently. Some 
components of a natural demonstration will serve as variables in the ERP studies, 
including the presence of a pointing gesture and shared gaze. 
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Chapter 3: 
The role of shared gaze: An ERP study of English demonstratives 
 
3.1. Introduction. 
The concept of control spaces as a means to explain demonstrative use should be 
evaluated by its predictions. A control space is formed by constraints, physical or 
symbolic, and allows for agents to negotiate how they might pursue action with an object. 
One way that a speaker could distinguish possibilities for action would be to categorize 
whether an object is more easily controlled by the speaker or her listener. All else being 
equal—both agents are able-bodied and are facing the object, etc.—one way to evaluate 
each agent’s potential for higher control of an object could be simply their relative 
distance to the object. If an object is close to the speaker, we might categorize this space 
differently than if the object is close to the hearer, as the hearer would then be able to 
exert more control over the object. However, even if the hearer is close to the object, we 
would not necessarily expect for her to exert the most control over an object if she is not 
attending in the direction of the referent. The notion of control spaces thus leads to two 
initial predictions, corresponding to Hypotheses 2 and 3 in Chapter 1. Firstly, language 
users are sensitive to relative distance in the acceptability of a demonstrative form. 
Secondly, the sensitivity based on relative distance will be reduced if the hearer is not 
attending in the direction of the referent. 
 In order to consider these predictions, an experiment was performed that tests 
language users’ responses to visual scenes accompanied by different demonstrative 
expressions. The experiment tested both behavioral and electrophysiological responses to 
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simultaneous presentations of a picture and an auditory stimulus, to which participants 
either expressed that they agreed or disagreed that the combination would be an 
expecting pairing. The experiment described below was published in the Stevens and 
Zhang (2013) paper, “Relative distance and gaze in the use of entity-referring spatial 
demonstratives: an event-related potential study.” 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, there are various accounts for demonstratives in 
English and other languages. Traditional accounts of English demonstratives have 
emphasized distance from the speaker as a distinguishing feature of demonstrative forms 
(Halliday & Hasan, 1979; Lyons, 1977; Quirk, 1979). Other accounts emphasize the role 
of attention (e.g., Diessel, 2006; Fillmore, 1971; Himmelmann, 1992). Accounts that use 
similar concepts of attentional state, cognitive status, and focus also have been proposed 
(Fillmore, 1971; Gundel et al., 1993; Hanks, 1992; Strauss, 2002). The model proposed 
presently, that of control spaces, seeks to build on the strong points of both a distance 
model and an attentional model. It is argued here that relative distance to the speaker or 
to another participant is relevant, as distance will factor into the action possibilities 
available to the respective agents. However, relative distance as a distinguishing feature 
can be easily superseded by attentional factors, such as redirection of the hearer’s gaze. 
According to the control spaces model, a referent that is near the hearer can still be 
labeled with the so-called proximal demonstrative “this” if the hearer is not looking in 
that direction, as the speaker would be considered to exert more control over the referent 
in that context despite the greater physical distance because of the hearer’s attention 
elsewhere. 
 Despite the linguistic investigations into demonstratives, we still lack a basic 
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understanding of the mental processes underlying demonstrative use in spatial reference, 
including the neural mechanism to our intuitions for their usage. Psycholinguistic 
evidence gives some support to the view that demonstratives serve to demarcate distances 
from the speaker (Coventry et al., 2008). It has been noted earlier, however, that distance 
cannot alone explain demonstrative use, as there are many other extra-linguistic factors to 
consider, including gaze and the use of a pointing gesture. All cultures, for instance, use 
gesture, and all languages include demonstratives used with pointing, and all languages 
have demonstratives associated with pointing (Diessel, 2006). Moreover, the finding of 
distance factoring into demonstrative form choice did not consider the role of distance to 
a hearer in the Coventry et al. study. 
 In order to address the above questions in a novel matter, we used the event-
related potential (ERP) technique in combination with behavioral measures such as 
acceptability judgment and reaction time. The ERP technique makes use of averaged 
EEG recordings time-locked to stimuli and provides a measure of temporal description of 
neural activity. Different experimental paradigms can evoke recognizable patterns of 
EEG signal. As an example, a signal peak of negative potential at approximately 200 ms 
after a stimulus, called the N200, detects a mismatch of information (Sutton, Braren, 
Zubin, & John, 1965), even for language tasks (Schmitt, Münte, & Kutas, 2000). A 
possibly related ERP component, the N400, has been found to register semantic 
information or contextual incongruities (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011; Kutas & Hillyard, 
1980, 1984; Osterhout, Willems, Kita, & Hagoort, 2002). If, for instance, a subject was 
presented with the sentence “I always put on my socks before my car,” we would expect 
to observe a larger negative peak at 400ms after the onset of the final word than would be 
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recorded after the presentation of the sentence “I always put on my socks before my 
pants.” 
Although no ERP studies previous to Stevens and Zhang (2013) have been 
reported that compare the use of demonstratives to pick out objects in space, several ERP 
studies have taken up the question of the interpretation of gesture use (Cornejo et al., 
2009; Holle & Gunter, 2007; Kelly, Kravitz, & Hopkins, 2004; Kelly, Ward, Creigh, & 
Bartoletti, 2007; Wu & Coulson, 2005, 2007). Kelly et al. (2004) elicted an N400 effect 
by pairing hand gestures indicating spatial dimensions with words that connote spatial 
concepts (e.g., tall, short, wide), if the gesture and word did not match (e.g., pairing the 
word “short” while gesturing wide by spreading out one’s hands). An N400 effect has 
also been produced when a gesture did not correspond with the interpretation of an 
ambiguous word (Holle & Gunter, 2007). In that experiment, participants were given 
ambiguous information, such as “Everybody was impressed by Sandra. She controlled 
the ball,” where “ball” could mean either a setting for dancing or an object used in a 
game. An accompanying gesture suggested one of these two meanings, but if the verbal 
material that followed indicated the other meaning of the ambiguous word, a late negative 
waveform was observed. Cornejo et al. (2009) paired gestures with metaphorical speech. 
For example, the participant might hear (in Spanish) “Those young people are giraffes.” 
In the incongruent condition, the gesture accompanying the verbal stimulus “giraffes” is a 
hand held at the waist indicating short height, and this pairing yielded an N400 effect.   
  Özyürek, Willems, Kita, and Hagoort (2007) compared the time course of ERP 
responses to incongruent gestures with those to incongruent speech and found that 
semantic interpretation of gestures corresponded with the time course of the 
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interpretation of speech, suggesting a similar neural processing mechanism.  These 
studies of gesture use support the view that gestures contribute to the interpretative 
process, in that bimodal information (i.e. speech and gesture) is integrated into a single 
conceptual representation (McNeill, 1992). An opposing view contends that gestures are 
epiphenomal effects that do not contribute significantly to the interpretation of 
information (Krauss, Dushay, Chen, & Rauscher, 1995). It is not straightforward how this 
debate informs the interaction of gesture with demonstrative use. Demonstratives rely on 
extra-linguistic cues such as gesture more so than words with more conceptual meaning 
that may uniquely pick out an object in a context without additional, non-linguistic 
behavior (e.g. the short glass vs. that glass). 
From the above studies of gesture comprehension, we might consider an N400 
component to be the most likely effect observed from incongruent spatial demonstrative 
use, given the similarities of gesture and demonstrative use, as well as the repeated 
finding of an N400 effect from other contextual surprises, such as the strangeness of the 
image of a man in a business suit standing on one leg in the desert (Proverbio & Riva, 
2009) or simply saying “Dutch trains are white” to subjects in the Netherlands, who 
would all know that Dutch trains are yellow (Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 
2004).   
The P600, an ERP that shows a positive wave deflection at approximately 600 ms 
post-stimulus was previously thought to reflect only syntactic anomaly (Hagoort, Brown, 
& Groothusen, 1993) but has been observed in response to special cases of semantic 
incongruity (Kim & Osterhout, 2005; Kuperberg, Sitnikova, Caplan, & Holcomb, 2003; 
Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2005). Kuperberg (2007) argues that a P600 effect will be 
   52 
 52
observed more likely than an N400 when there is a violation of semantic verb-argument 
relationships. For example, Paczynki, Kreher, Ditman, and Holcomb (2006) were able to 
differentially yield an N400 effect and a P600 effect based on the animacy requirement of 
a verb. When a subject heard the phrase “At long last the man’s pain was understood by 
the ...,” an unremarkable completion to this sentence would be “doctor.” A doctor is not 
only capable of understanding pain, being animate, but also is contextually appropriate, 
as people typically discuss their pain with health care professionals. If, instead of 
“doctor,” the final word had been “violinist,” an N400 effect was observed, because 
violinists are not usually expected to hear of someone’s pain. When the final word was 
instead “pens,” then a P600 effect was instead seen. Pens do not satisfy the animacy 
requirement to understand something, which makes the sentence difficult to process in a 
way that differs categorically from hearing of a violinist understanding one’s pain, an 
unusual but not impossible situation. A P600 effect is similarly observed in other 
experiments where the NP does not satisfy a requirement of the verb, e.g., “The hearty 
meal was devouring...,” as devour requires an animate subject, in comparison to the 
acceptability of it having an inanimate object:  “The hearty meal was devoured...” (Kim 
& Osterhout, 2005). An unexpected use of a demonstrative, such as the above example of 
using “that” to refer to the shirt one is wearing, might be considered more likely to evoke 
an N400-like phenomenon, since the unexpected use of a demonstrative form within a 
spatial context still has meaning, unlike pain being understood by a pen. However, given 
the dependence of demonstratives on additional cues to successfully pick out an object, it 
is also possible for a P600 effect to be observed, if the structure of a demonstrative form 
and extra-linguistic cues are not compatible.   
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In addition to the above work on gesture using EEG, several other studies have 
used fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) to localize cortical regions 
responsible for processing gestures (Dick, Goldin-Meadow, Hasson, Skipper, & Small, 
2009; Green et al., 2009; Xu, Gannon, Emmorey, Smith, & Braun, 2009). For instance, 
Green et al. (2009) found that when participants observed gestures that matched 
accompanying speech, occipital regions were activated, whereas parietal and posterior 
temporal brain regions were activated if the gesture was unrelated to concurrent speech. 
Gesture comprehension and spoken language were also found to map to the superior and 
inferior temporal cortices, respectively (Xu et al., 2009). The left anterior frontal gyrus 
and bilateral posterior superior temporal sulcus responded more to speech when a gesture 
accompanied the auditory information. The right inferior frontal gyrus responded to the 
semantic processing of hand gestures (Dick et al., 2009). The left inferior frontal gyrus 
activation for semantic processing was reported in several other studies (Grindrod, 
Bilenko, Myers, & Blumstein, 2008; Moss, Rodd, Stamatakis, Bright, & Tyler, 2005; Zhu 
et al., 2009). 
 The ERP study discussed in this chapter is the first project to investigate the 
neural mechanisms behind demonstrative use for objects in space (Stevens & Zhang, 
2013). The study measures the semantic congruency/incongruency effect of a visual 
scene and an auditory phrase that contained an English demonstrative (“this one” or “that 
one”). There were two primary goals to the project. The first goal was to investigate 
whether an N400 effect, seen in previous ERP work on semantic processing, would be 
elicited from the presentation of demonstratives in unexpected ways. Moreover, there 
would be a question if differences would emerge regarding the time course, the waveform 
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morphology, and the scalp distribution in a study of demonstratives with a visual context, 
as compared to studies with verbal stimuli only. A second goal sought to localize those 
brain regions that respond with the judgment of acceptable demonstrative use in space. 
The hypothesis related to the first goal is that an N400 effect would be observed, 
similarly to gesture ERP projects, when subjects are presented with unexpected pairings 
of demonstratives and visual scenes. Given the newness of this experimental design, it is 
difficult to specify the hypothesis further, but we might expect for the latency of the ERP 
component to increase in light of the complex task of integrating relative distance and 
joint gaze in conjunction to a verbal stimulus. Again, we would expect for the 
acceptability judgment of spatial demonstrative use to be similar to that in the N400 
studies and would therefore expect a dominant posterior negativity scalp distribution 
(e.g., Johnson & Hamm, 2000) and specifically a parietal cortical response in line with 
semantic processing studies that have made use of fMRI (Chou, Chen, Wu, & Booth, 
2009; Grossman et al., 2003). 
 
3.2. Methods. 
3.2.1. Participants. 
Participants include sixteen native English speakers, 1:1 ratio of male:female, recruited 
by advertisement. The average handedness index of the subjects was +0.9 (right-handed), 
according to the Edinburgh handedness inventory (Oldfield, 1971). The average age of 
subjects was 25, ranging between 21-34 years of age. All subjects had normal hearing, 
normal or corrected vision and no known history of color-blindedness, speech, language, 
or hearing disorder. The protocol approved by the Human Subjects’ Protection Program 
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in coordination with the Institutional Review Board at the University of Minnesota was 
used for the purpose of obtaining consent from subjects. The subjects were each paid $30 
for their time. The data from two subjects was removed from final analysis, because 
insufficient trials were available due to excessive blinking and other muscular activity. 
 
3.2.2. Stimulus material. 
To produce the auditory stimuli, an AT&T text-to-speech was used 
(http://www2.research.att.com/wttsweb/tts/demo.php). The stimuli for the demonstrative 
phrases included “this one” and “that one” in a female voice. The use of only a female 
voice was chosen to avoid confusion regarding the role of the characters. The samples 
were digitally edited, and they were resampled at 44.1 KHz with the use of Sound Forge 
9 (SONY Corp.) software, and the root mean square intensity levels were normalized and 
equalized. 
 The visual stimuli were created with the use of Second Life software, a program 
with which virtual world scenarios can be generated in 3D (http://www.secondlife.com). 
The scenes all included a woman pointing to a blue cat (the referent), as she was always 
the speaker. A man was also present, acting as hearer, and he sometimes was shown 
looking in the same direction as the woman and sometimes not. Other objects were 
included for the sake of contrast, such as orange cats that were never the referent. The 
visual scenes presented to the subjects fit into six categories, divided by their use of 
relative distance and shared gaze. In the “speaker-associated” (SA) context, the referent 
blue cat was within the speaker’s arm’s reach. This context would always fit the 
description of a primary control space, as the speaker would have more action 
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possibilities at her disposal for interacting with the referent than would the hearer. When 
the referent was placed within arm’s length of the hearer (the man), these visual scenes 
were categorized as a “hearer-associated” (HA) context. A hearer-associated context does 
not align necessarily with a secondary control space. If the hearer shares the speaker’s 
gaze during this referential act, then indeed we would include the referent object in a 
secondary control space, as the hearer would have an advantage for physical interaction 
with the referent if the object is closer to the hearer. A hearer-associated context (i.e., the 
object is closer to the hearer) can still function as a primary control space if the hearer is 
attending elsewhere with his gaze, as he would not be able to take advantage of the 
physical proximity to the referent if it is not in his attention. For the “non-associated” 
(NA) context, the referent was far away from both the speaker and hearer (i.e. the man 
and woman were closer to each other than to the cat). Again, the assignment of control 
space in a non-associated context depends on gaze. If the speaker and hearer are 
attending in the same direction, then they would together form a primary vantage point 
and the referent would be seen as distant from them collectively, and the referent would 
occupy secondary control space far from the speaker and hearer’s shared perspective. If 
the hearer in a non-associated context is looking in a different direction than the referent, 
then an ambiguity emerges. The speaker may still treat the referent as distant from the 
location of discourse and assign it a form correlated with a secondary control space (e.g., 
“that), or the speaker may interpret the referent within her own, primary control space 
and assign it a correlated form (e.g., “this”) because the hearer cannot as readily act on 
the object without attending to it. Gaze is used thus as a variable: half the pictures show 
the man (the hearer) looking in the same direction as the speaker (“shared gaze”); in half 
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the pictures, the hearer’s gaze is directed in a different direction (“no shared gaze”). 
 The combination of visual and auditory stimuli includes the following. The visual 
scenes are divided by spatial distance into three contexts (SA, HA, and NA). Another 
division among the visual scenes is whether or not the hearer shows a shared gaze. The 
visual scenes were each paired with a verbal phrase, “this one” or “that one,” resulting in 
twelve total possible pairings of visual scene and demonstrative phrase. (Fig. 3.1). 
 
3.2.3. Procedure. 
The audio-visual stimuli were presented simultaneously with EEvoke software (ANT 
Inc., the Netherlands) (Fig. 3.1). The images were displayed on a 1900 ViewSonic LCD 
monitor at approximately one meter in front of the participant with a 2 ms response time. 
The subjects were placed in an acoustically and electrically treated room (ETS-Lindgren 
Acoustic Systems) and were seated in a comfortable chair such that the center of the top 
of the monitor is level with their eyes. The visual scenes were presented for 2000 ms on 
the screen with an inter-stimulus interval of 1000 ms. A keyboard (DirectIN-PCB 
keyboard from Empirisoft Corp.) was placed on the patient’s lap for their responses. 
 Sounds were delivered through bilateral earphones with a presentation level at 60 
dB sensation level calibrated per individual on the basis of their hearing threshold (Rao, 
Zhang, & Miller, 2010). The participants completed the experiment in 1.5 hours, split 
into five sessions with breaks. The participants were given instructions in both auditory 
and visual modalities that the scenes would include a man and a woman, and that the 
woman would always be referring to the blue cat in the scene, despite other objects being 
present, with one of the following expressions:  “this one” or “that one”. Patients were 
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requested to press one of two buttons on the computer keyboard to indicate whether the 
visual scene and demonstrative expression were an expected or unexpected pairing. 
 The procedure for this experiment differs from other possible procedures that 
might use the visual stimulus to prime the auditory information. A simultaneous 
presentation of auditory and visual stimuli has been used in previous experiments, both 
with the use of ERP and fMRI, as the presentation of both modalities together provides a 
more natural experience for the subjects (de Gelder, Böcker, Tuomainen, Hensen, & 
Vroomen, 1999; Ullsperger, Erdmann, Freude, & Dehoff, 2006). The simultaneous 
audio-visual paradigm was chosen after a pilot priming procedure that conducted for 
three subjects in addition to those whose data were used in the final analysis and who 
rated the simultaneous paradigm higher than a sequential presentation. The subjects first 
underwent a familiarization phase, exposing them for two minutes to the various visual 
configurations, including the varied spatial distances and shared gaze vs. non-shared gaze 
conditions in combination with the two verbal stimuli. Following the familiarization task 
was a test phase consisting of 100 trials of the images and verbal expressions presented in 
random sequence. The subjects were instructed to judge the semantic congruency of each 
audio-visual pairing and press the appropriate computer key as soon as possible to signal 
agreement or disagreement that an image and demonstrative expression form an expected 
pairing. 
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Fig. 3.1. Visual stimulus and presentation cycle. (a) An example of a visual scene 
presented to the subjects. The female speaker is referring to an object in a Hearer-
associated (HA) context without shared gaze (b) Schematic illustration of presentation 
protocol. The visual scene lasted 2000 ms, and it was simultaneously presented with a 
female voice referring to the blue cat as either “this one” or “that one.” 
 
3.2.4. EEG recording. 
The EEG data were collected with the use of a 64-channel Advanced Neuro Technology 
system, which had been used in previous ERP studies with auditory stimuli (Rao et al., 
2010; Zhang et al., 2011). A 512 Hz sampling rate was used, and the bandpass was 
between 0.016 and 200 Hz. The AFz site was used as the ground electrode. The EEG cap 
included shielded wires for 65 Ag/AgCL electrodes, which followed the configuration of 
the international 10–20 montage system and intermediate locations. The common average 
of the connected unipolar electrode inputs served as the reference for the amplifier. The 
impedence for the electrodes was maintained below 5 kOhm. The event markers for the 
ERPs were time-locked to the onset of the picture and auditory stimulus presented 
simultaneously. 
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3.2.5. Behavioral data analysis. 
Behavioral data were recorded for each trial of all the subjects. Given the possibility of 
ambiguity using the control space model, the congruency of a scene-demonstrative 
pairing was based on the traditional models based on distance. If the referent object was 
in the speaker-associated space, the congruent response expected was when the 
demonstrative phrase was “this one” and incongruent when it was “that one.” When the 
referent object was located in hearer-associated or non-associated space, the congruent 
response would occur when the demonstrative phrase heard was “that one” and 
incongruent when the phrase was “this one.” Reponses that conformed with the these 
congruency parameters would be categorized as a match (hit) or a mismatch (correct 
rejection). Sensitivity (d-prime) was calculated according to signal detection theory, 
which treats the formal of an internal representation sensory process of forming an 
internal representation from a stimulus in order to make a decision (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 1991). In order to control for false positives and perceptive biases, a 
comparison was made of d-prime values, rather than percent correct responses. Repeated-
measures ANOVA tests were conducted on the d-prime values to evaluate for 
significance across conditions for response rate. The factors used in the ANOVA tests 
were spatial context (SA, HA, NA), gaze (share gaze, no shared gaze), and congruency 
effect (congruent, incongruent). Identical ANOVA tests were used to average reaction 
time data. When a significant interaction was found, post-hoc two-tailed t-tests were 
applied to find those subcategories of spatial contexts that showed a significant 
congruency effect. 
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3.2.6. ERP waveform analysis. 
ERP analysis was conducted with the use of common average reference in ASA 4.7.3 
package (Advanced Source Analysis, ANT Corp.). ERP epochs were designated as 900 
ms windows with a 100 ms pre-stimulus baseline. When potentials surpassed 50mV in 
magnitude, these events were rejected offline as artifact. A bandpass filter was applied 
between 0.5-40 Hz. The minimum average number of accepted trials was 50 for a subject 
in any of the spatial contexts. Weighted averaging of accepted trials was applied to 
calculate the grand average. The influence from individual subjects with fewer trials was 
thus mitigated (Zhang et al., 2011). 
 Six scalp regions were designated to consider local effects by the following 
groupings of electrode sites (Fig. 3.2). A right temporal-parietal (RTP) group was formed 
from the following electrodes:  TP7, CP5, CP3, P7, P5, and P3, and the left hemisphere 
counterparts comprised a left temporal-parietal (LTP) group. A right parietal-occipital 
(RPO) group was formed from PO7, PO5, PO3, and O1, and a left parietal-occipital 
(LPO) group was formed from the counterpart sites on the left hemisphere. A centro-
parietal midline group (MID) included CPz, CP1, CP2, Pz, P1, and P2. The electrodes 
POz and Oz comprised a midline parietal-occipital group (MPO). Similar grouping of 
electrode sites have been used in previous studies (Rao et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2011). 
 The area under the ERP waveforms was analyzed for set time intervals, rather 
than using peak analysis at regional electrode sites. Area analysis was chosen because the 
ERPs in this study showed late, slow deflections with clearly defined peaks for most 
subjects’ data. A point-to-point t-test was used for ERPs in the congruent and incongruent 
conditions to determine the time windows to investigate. The time windows were defined 
   62 
 62
on the basis of time intervals that the Pz electrode showed significant differences between 
the congruent and incongruent conditions (e.g., Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). The time 
interval would be said to show a congruency effect if a significant difference (p < 0.05) 
was observed for minimally 40ms (Zhang et al., 2011). 
Repeated-measures ANOVA tests were conducted in Systat (Version 12) to assess 
the main factors spatial context, congruency, scalp region, and laterality. Laterality was 
tested using right hemisphere sites (RFC, RTP, RPO) versus left hemisphere sites (LFC, 
LTP, LPO). Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied wherever appropriate. A 
modified two-tailed point-to-point t-test procedure that is similar to Bonferroni correction 
was applied to the regional electrode groupings to evaluate the temporal nature of 
differences between the congruent and incongruent conditions (Guthrie & Buchwald, 
1991; Zhang et al., 2011).  
 
3.2.7. Global field power analysis.  
The Global Field Power (GFP) shows an overall effect across the scalp independently of 
electrode location. This measure was calculated for the experimental conditions of all the 
participants’ datasets. The GFP describes the distribution of potentials for all 64 
electrodes over the scalp in terms of their standard deviation at every sampling point 
during the ERP epoch, one is able to (Hamburger & Burgt, 1991; Lehmann & Skrandies, 
1980). The sampling points for the congruent and incongruent conditions were converted 
into z scores relative to the distribution of baseline GFP 100 ms pre-stimulus (Rao et al., 
2010). A congruency effect was identified for latency intervals where a significant 
difference between the congruent and incongruent conditions persisted for at least 40 ms. 
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3.2.8. sLORETA analysis. 
Standardized low-resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) was used for 
source estimation of the ERP data with use of the ASA software (Version 4.7.3). 
LORETA uses an inverse solution to localize distributed sources of activity (Pascual-
Marqui, Michel, & Lehmann, 1994). An improved algorithm is used for the present data 
that standardizes the signal-to-noise ratio and therefore minimizes the effect of inherent 
noise in the EEG signal in source localization (Pascual-Marqui, Esslen, Kochi, & 
Lehmann, 2002; Sekihara, Sahani, & Nagarajan, 2005). 
 The sLORETA analysis followed the following steps: 
1. sLORETA analysis was applied for the averaged ERP data for every individual and for 
each condition. 
2. Standard positions for electrodes were taken from a healthy adult subject’s MRI 
structure to produce a volume conductor head model. The Boundary Element Model 
method was used to form a three-layer head model with consideration for the geometric 
and electrical properties of head anatomy, allowing one to work with a realistic head 
model for source localization (Zhang et al., 2009, 2011; Zhang, Kuhl, Imada, Kotani, & 
Tohkura, 2005). 
3. Source spaces were modeled as surfaces on which dipoles were equidistantly 
distributed and interconnected with triangles to display dipole magnitude by color and 
contour. Three orthogonal dipoles were placed at one location to make dipole orientation 
a free parameter as well. The dipoles were combined to one at pre-specified locations 
during the final amplitude computation for statistical analysis. The grid spacing for the 
   64 
 64
sLORETA metric was set at 20 mm (Zhang et al., 2009). Tikhonov regularization, 
computed by the Generalized Cross Validation method, was used to smooth out the 
source current distribution, with balanced sensitivity to superficial and deep current 
(Bortel & Sovka, 2007; Tychonoff & Arsenin, 1977). 
4.  sLORETA amplitude data for all dipoles and the relevant spatial coordinates were 
exported in ASCII format and analyzed for regions of interest (ROI). To define the ROIs, 
coordinates were transformed to the standard volume of Talaraich coordinates (Talairach 
& Tournoux, 1988). Spatial coordinates were then converted into Brodmann Area with 
the use of the Talaraich Client (www.talairach.org) (Lancaster et al., 2000). The ROIs for 
the present project, given it being a language task, include the parietal lobe (Brodmann 
Areas 5,7), left middle and superior temporal gyri (BA 21,22), and the parahippocampal 
gyrus (BA 36). The sLORETA amplitude for these ROIs were each calculated as the sum 
of the dipole activities for that region. 
5. The sLORETA data for the ROIs were then analyzed with repeated-measures 
ANOVA, after which post-hoc analysis between the congruent and incongruent 
conditions at each ROI and for each spatial context was performed with Bonferroni-
corrected two-tailed t-tests. 
 
3.3. Results. 
3.3.1. Behavioral data. 
Repeated measures ANOVA test for behavioral conformity data did not show significant 
effects for three main factors:  congruency, spatial context (SA, HA, NA), and gaze 
(shared vs. non-shared). A high level of consistency (above 95% acceptance) was 
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observed for each type of congruent pairings (Table 3.1). The level of consistency for 
incongruent pairings was over 90% rejection. Corresponding d-prime scores were above 
2. The reaction time data (Table 1) showed significant main effects for congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent) [F(1,13) = 34, p < 0.0001] and spatial configuration (SA, 
HA, and NA) [F(2,26) = 11.3, p < 0.001]. A significant interaction between spatial 
context and the shared gaze condition was found as well, [F(2,26) =7.8, p < 0.01].  Post-
hoc t-tests revealed a role for shared gaze for the congruency effect, such that only in the 
shared gaze condition were reaction times significantly longer for the incongruent 
pairings than the congruent pairings for each of the spatial contexts (SA, HA, NA), p < 
0.01. No significant differences were observed in reaction times between congruent and 
incongruent pairings without shared gaze between the speaker and hearer. 
 
Table 3.1. Behavioral data of English demonstratives per gaze and congruency 
conditions. Data include mean reaction times (TRT) with standard deviation (s.d.), mean 
percent response conformity with expected demonstrative form, and mean d0 values for 
SA (speaker-associated), HA (hearer-associated), and NA (non-associated) context with 
and without shared gaze in congruent and incongruent conditions. Congruency effect was 
observed in RT data for SA, HA, NA contexts in the shared gaze conditions. 
 
3.3.2. ERP waveform data. 
The ERP waveforms data were tested in repeated-measures ANOVA with the following 
main factors:  congruency, spatial context, gaze, and laterality (left vs. right electrode 
sites) (Fig. 3.2). Significant effects for spatial context [F(2,26) = 13.3, p < 0.001], gaze 
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[F(1,13) = 8.4, p < 0.05], and laterality [F(1,13) = 6.1, p < 0.05] during the 525-725ms 
time window. A significant interaction between congruency and spatial context, [F(2,26) 
= 7.7, p < 0.01],  suggests that congruency decisions depend on spatial context. ANOVA 
tests for the earlier intervals (100–200 ms, 200–300 ms, 300–500 ms) showed no 
significant effect for congruency. ANOVA tests were then tested for the three spatial 
contexts separately for a congruency effect as a function of electrode location and gaze. 
In the HA context with shared gaze, a significant congruent effect was found, [F(1,13) = 
4.8, p < 0.05], as well as a significant interaction of congruency and electrode region 
[F(8,104) = 4.5, p < 0.001]. Follow-up point-to-point t-tests showed a significant 
congruency effect at centro-parietal electrode sites, including MID [p < 0.01], MPO [p < 
0.01], LPO [p < 0.001], RPO [p < 0.001], LTP [p < 0.01], and RTP [p < 0.05] (Fig. 3.2). 
In contrast with the behavioral data, the SA and NA contexts did not reveal a significant 
congruency effect in the ANOVA tests with shared gaze. 
 
3.3.3. Global field power data. 
The data from the global field power showed a significant congruency effect at different 
time intervals for different spatial contexts (Fig. 3.2). The SA contexts, similarly to the 
ANOVA analysis, did not show significant congruent effects with or without shared gaze 
in terms of converted z scores for the GFP data. In the HA context with shared gaze, a 
significant congruency effect was observed during the windows 200-500 ms, 575-615 
ms, and 730-800 ms. For the NA context with shared gaze, a significant congruency 
effect was found during the GFP data during the 280-760 ms time window. 
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Fig. 3.2. Waveform analysis of gesture condition. (a) Global field power data, left to 
right, for the speaker-associated context, hearer-associated context, and non-associated 
context, all with shared gaze. The black line is the congruent condition and the gray line 
is the incongruent condition. Shaded areas show time intervals of at least 80 ms at the 
significance level of 0.01 (b) Grand average ERP waveform amplitude (mV) from six 
electrode groups during the hearer-associated spatial context with shared gaze with head 
model to show ROIs. The black line represents the congruent condition, and the gray line 
the incongruent condition. The grouping sites on the scalp are marked in the head model. 
Shaded areas indicate time intervals of minimally 40 ms where the point-to-point t-test 
with correction for multiple correction was significant [p < 0.05] (c) Scalp distribution 
maps for the HA context at 600 ms. Included are the congruent and incongruent scalp 
distribution maps, as well as the difference (incongruent – congruent). 
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3.3.4. sLORETA data. 
The sLORETA analysis revealed three main regions of activity for the congruency effect: 
the left middle and superior temporal gyri (BA 21, 22), the parahippocampal gyri (BA 
36), and a broad area of activation at posterior regions, including the superior parietal 
lobule (BA 5, 7), the primary motor cortex (BA 4), and the cingulate gyrus (BA 31) 
(Table 3.2). Significant effects for sLORETA amplitude results were found in the 525-
725 ms interval for the main factor of spatial context, [F(2,26) = 7.7, p < 0.01], as well as 
the interaction of congruency and brain region, [F(2,26) ¼ 4.1, p < 0.05]. A significant 
congruency effect was found by post-hoc t-tests in three cortical areas for the HA spatial 
context with shared gaze:  the left temporal gyri [p < 0.05], the left superior parietal 
lobule [p < 0.001], and the right superior temporal lobule [p < 0.01] (Fig. 3.3). Parietal 
activation was therefore bilateral. No significant congruency effect was gathered from the 
SA and NA spatial contexts during the 525-725 ms window irrespective of gaze. 
 
Table 3.2. sLORETA data per congruity condition in the hearer-associated context for 
three regions of interest. Spatial locations with Brodmann area (BA) and coordinates 
were determined in the Talairach space. ***stands for p < 0.001, *for p < 0.05, n.s. for 
not significant.  
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Fig. 3.3. Grand mean sLORETA results for hearer-associated space with shared gaze. 
Significant differences were observed between the congruent and incongruent conditions 
at a broad posterior region and at the left middle and superior temporal gyri. Stronger 
activation for the congruent condition was found at the left temporal cortex and the 
parietal lobe bilaterally. 
 
 
3.4. Discussion. 
As an experiment to pursue difficult questions regarding the function of demonstrative 
use, we have some evidence to approach the questions freshly. No single experiment will 
prove or even substantiate a theoretical framework such as that of control space, but the 
experiment is able to test individual hypotheses. As discussed in Chapter 1, the control 
space model would predict for the acceptability of a demonstrative form to depend on 
relative distance, so long as the interlocutors have shared gaze. A related hypothesis 
predicted from the control space concept is that relative gaze should serve less in 
demonstrative form selection if no shared gaze is maintained between speaker and 
audience. Another hypothesis, which is not specific to any model of demonstrative use, is 
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that incongruent pairings of demonstrative form and visual context would elicit an N400. 
The finding of an N400 would further support the interpretation of this component as an 
index of unexpected data for a given context. 
 
3.4.1. Dependency of relative distance and gaze for demonstrative use. 
There are reasons in favor and against the traditional account for spatial demonstratives 
in English that describes the use of “this” and “that” as connoting near and far space, 
respectively (Halliday & Hasan, 1979; Lyons, 1977; Quirk, 1979). The role that gaze 
plays in the acceptance of these forms gives reason for caution with a distance model. 
The control space account does, however, expect for distance to play a role in form 
selection, and the data presented above support this claim. The behavioral accuracy data 
in the present study were consistent with the view that demonstrative choice makes use of 
physical space as a division, particularly between near contexts (SA) and that for far 
contexts (HA, NA).  
  Other evidence has supported the distance-based distinction in demonstratives, 
such as the psycholinguistic work by Coventry et al. (2008). The authors argue in fact for 
an anatomical basis for the spatial correlates of demonstrative forms, based on how the 
human visual system processed near and far space differently. This argument, however, 
does not clear take into account the importance of shared gaze. The authors themselves 
do not explain how an anatomical account of demonstrative use would adequately 
describe their own observation that pointing tools could mitigate the role of perceptual 
distance. 
The data from the present study show that only with shared gaze did the response 
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times between congruent and incongruent pairings differ significantly. These results 
coincide with Diessel’s (2006) claim that English speakers consider joint attention in the 
selection of demonstrative forms. The present data suggest that neither joint attention nor 
spatial distance alone can explain English demonstrative use, as the role for attention 
cannot in itself serve as a complete replacement for relative distance. The response time 
data from the present project do show that distance from the speaker affected 
demonstrative form acceptance when shared gaze was present. Interestingly, no 
significant differences were found between “this one” and “that one” when the hearer 
was looking elsewhere. The role of joint attention in English demonstrative selection 
would not be unique to that language. In Turkish, a language with three demonstratives, 
“bu” and “o” depend on relative distance, yet a third form, “su,” relates primarily to the 
hearer’s attention (Küntay & Özyürek, 2006).  
Distance from the speaker not only cannot serve as an adequate predictor of 
demonstrative form because of the mitigating role for gaze but also because space from 
the hearer is relevant. The ERP results reveal a significant congruency effect in the 
latency window of 525-725 ms during the hearer-associated (HA) context with shared 
gaze. In other words, participants seem to be more sensitive in their acceptance of the 
distal form, “that one,” when used close to a hearer than when used for referents distant 
from the conversation. 
The congruency effect in the ERP data confirmed the hypothesis that an N400-
like component would be elicited to unexpected pairings of demonstrative and visual 
context. The ERP was observed over the posterior scalp with maximum amplitude 
approximately at 600 ms post-stimulus. The later latency of the ERP is understood to 
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result from the complexity of the task:  interpreting verbal information in conjunction 
with a visual scene that includes such important landmarks as a speaker, hearer (with 
gaze variation), and referent, among various distracters. The centro-parietal scalp 
potential distribution of the present ERP finding and its finding in response to varied 
spatial contexts resembles the Gesture N450 effect reported by Wu and Coulson (2005). 
The longer latency of the present data may result from the subtlety of the decision to 
accept a demonstrative for spatial reference, a form of expression that may be vaguer 
than verbal-only descriptions. 
The complexity of the task in judging spatial use of demonstratives may also 
inform the differences in results from the behavioral data, the ERP waveform, GFP, and 
sLORETA analyses. The reaction time data showed a congruency effect for all spatial 
contexts with shared gaze. The ERP data, however, showed a significant congruency 
effect for the HA context. The SA and NA contexts, according to the grand average (Fig. 
3.2), have the appearance of an effect that was not borne out statistically, a pattern that 
may point to variability among subjects’ brain responses. Minor discrepancies in results 
among the ERP waveform, GFP, and sLORETA may also be due to differences in 
technical procedure. For instance, the GFP is calculated on the basis of ERP data from all 
electrodes, whereas the sLORETA makes use of a source localization algorithm that is 
sensitive to the signal-to-noise ratio of the ERP data. Despite differences in results by 
type of analysis, the ERP waveform, GFP, and sLORETA data all showed a late negative 
congruency effect in the HA context with shared gaze that would be consistent with 
previous N400 reports. 
 Notably, the sLORETA analysis indicated a cortical network for the late N400 
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effect found in this study, namely, the parahippocampul gyrus, the left middle and 
superior temporal gyri, and a broad region of parietal lobe bilaterally. Consistently with 
the waveform analysis, the HA context with shared gaze was the only one to show a 
significant congruency effect per sLORETA. The active regions in the present study have 
been found to associate with processes of agency, attention, the distinction between self 
and others, and perception-action coupling procedures involved in social behavior 
(Decety & Lamm, 2007; Sommerville & Decety, 2006). The parietal cortex has also been 
found to be active during semantic integration, according to fMRI data (Chou et al., 
2009; Grossman et al., 2003). Although previous work has found the inferior parietal 
lobule to be involved especially in semantic processing, the present study found 
activation more properly in the superior parietal lobule (Chou et al., 2009), a site known 
to process spatial relationships between our hands and hand-held objects (Naito et al., 
2008). The superior parietal lobule has further more been implicated during reaching 
actions among primates (Caminiti, Ferraina, & Johnson, 1996) and during observed and 
imagined reaching among human subjects (Filimon, Nelson, Hagler, & Serenoa, 2007).    
 The other areas of activation in the present work can be easily understood for the 
task. The left temporal cortex, for instance, is a known site for semantic processing 
(Boddaert et al., 2004; Simos et al., 1999). The parahippocampal gyrus has been found to 
be associated with the negotiation of physical places while performing a task (Epstein, 
Harris, Stanley, & Kanwisher, 1999; Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998). Epstein and 
Kanwisher found this area to be engaged by viewing scenes but not in processing faces, 
objects, or faces. The need to calculate the spatial positions among figures in the visual 
contexts of this experiment may explain activation of the parahippocampal gyrus. 
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 The study discussed here offers new information regarding long-standing debates 
regarding demonstrative use. The traditional view of English demonstratives considers 
the forms “this” and “that” to differ according to distance from speaker, whereas more 
recent accounts have employed concepts of attention and focus to describe the functions 
of demonstratives separately. Data from the present experiment are that spatial distance 
alone does not seem to sufficiently define demonstrative terms in English. The behavioral 
reaction time data did find a congruency effect, based on distance, but this held true only 
for visual contexts where the speaker and hearer shared gaze. The ERP data further 
revealed a late negative deflection (525-725 ms post-stimulus), assumed here to be a 
variant of the N400 component, to index the unexpected use of demonstratives in the 
hearer-associated context (i.e. when the referent was within reach of the hearer) with 
shared gaze only. The more special contexts in which demonstrative use was processed 
anomalously, that is, with shared gaze and particularly when the referent was located near 
the hearer, suggest another explanation for demonstrative forms. If demonstrative use is 
driven more by how discourse participants analyze their control over space, the present 
data would support this account, as speakers and hearers would be sensitive to how far 
they are positioned physically from an object in order to evaluate possible actions toward 
the object, but this physical distance would matter less if the speaker and hearer do not 
share gaze and thus neither a shared sense of readiness to interact with an object. The 
observation that participants were sensitive to the distance of an object not only to the 
speaker but also to the hearer further suggests a description of demonstrative forms based 
on their relative ability for future interaction with a referent. 
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Chapter 4: 
The role of co-speech gesture: An ERP study of English and Japanese 
demonstratives  
 
4.1. Introduction. 
In Chapter 3, we saw how the ERP technique was helpful to investigate factors that 
influence the acceptability of demonstrative forms, including spatial distance of the 
referent to both speaker and hearer, as well as their gaze. A second electrophysiological 
experiment is discussed in this chapter, which is a revision of a manuscript submitted for 
publication (Stevens & Zhang, 2014), that considers additional basic questions regarding 
an expected demonstration. The concept of a control space, some restriction on physical 
or abstract space in which different agents can evaluate their possibilities for action, was 
used to explain the English speakers’ sensitivity to spatial distance and gaze toward an 
object in their acceptance of demonstrative forms. A useful extension of this concept is to 
employ data from other languages. Japanese offers an interesting system to compare with 
English, such that Japanese has three demonstrative morphemes, こ(“ko”), そ(“so”), and 
あ(“a”). An initial question would be whether a different language with divisions of form 
unlike English would also reaction time differences and an N400 effect when forms did 
not match visual contexts according to spatial distance. A second question that is basic to 
demonstrative use that has been discussed extensively above is gesture, and so it would 
be worthwhile to observe the effect of withholding a pointing gesture while using a 
demonstrative for spatial reference. The use of a pointing gesture to help establish a 
reference would be consistent with the concept of a control space, as a control space will 
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depend on such tools to restrict its dimensions as a gesture.  
The most long-standing explanations for English and Japanese demonstrative use 
make use of spatial distance to distinguish forms. English demonstratives have been 
explained in terms of distance from the speaker, such that “this” serves to refer to objects 
that are relatively near the speaker and “that” to pick out things that are not near the 
speaker. The traditional explanation of the Japanese demonstrative system is that “ko,” 
“so,” and “a” pick out an object that is close to the speaker, close to the hearer, and far 
from both, respectively, if the speaker and hearer do not have a shared perspective 
(Aoyama, 1995; Matsushita, 1901; Sakuma, 1936). The Japanese system differs from 
English by formally encoding the hearer’s position. 
The difference between the English and Japanese demonstrative systems suggests 
the possible influence of a language on categorization of space. The role that an 
individual language plays on the processing of the physical environment has been 
investigated for various categories, such as color. Winawer et al. (2007) experimentally 
confirmed the observation that English and Russian speakers discriminate colors 
differently for shades of the English blue by asking participants to choose which two of 
three color squares were identical. Native Russian speakers were able to discriminate 
between shades of blue corresponding to “siniy” and “goluboy” with a quicker reaction 
time than native English speakers. Notably, English speakers do divide light and dark 
blue at a similar point on the color spectrum to Russian “siniy” and “goluboy”, but 
Russian speakers discriminate obligatorily for reasons of communication.   
Spatial relationships have been argued to show the effect of linguistic 
categorization  (Bowerman, 2007; Clark, 1973; Landau & Jackendoff, 1993; Levinson, 
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2003; Lucy, 1992). Due to the abstractness of English prepositions, in which few physical 
constraints are placed on objects, Landau and Jackendoff (1993) take the distinctions to 
reflect universal distinctions of geometry. One argument for children having innate 
spatial reasoning reflects on the observation that children try to express spatial 
relationships before having the relevant lexicon, e.g., “towel bed” for a towel on a bed 
(Bloom, 1970). Similarly, children spontaneously overextend and underextend spatial 
concepts, a finding that argues against language strictly determining categorical division, 
but have been observed to do so in language-specific ways. English-speaking children, 
for instance, use ‘open’ to describe pulling apart two Frisbees (Bowerman, 1978). To 
investigate, Bowerman (1996, 2007) takes the case of spatial words acquired early by 
children, e.g., ‘in’, ‘on’, which presuppose a relationship in which a figure object 
interacts with a ground object, the latter classifiable as container or surface. Bowerman 
(1996) reports that children overgeneralize concepts in accordance with patterns in their 
language. For instance, Dutch children use the word “uit” to describe removal from a 
surface, based on analogy to adult use to take off clothing. Adult speakers of French and 
English have shown differences in analyzing objects in figure-ground contrasts 
(Hickmann, 2007). French speakers were less able than English speakers to describe a 
door handle’s location in relation to the door or to describe the location of a crack on a 
cup. In light of such language-dependent performance, Bowerman (2007) claims that 
spatial situations contain multiple properties that can serve to relate objects, and 
languages can focus on such properties idiosyncratically. 
Effects of language experience have also been observed in the context of 
directions. In English, directions are given often on the basis of a point of origin. For 
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example, the expression “on the left” places a destination relative to the location of the 
utterance. Besides a relative reference frame, it is possible to describe spatial 
relationships in intrinsic terms of an object (e.g., ‘in front of the TV’) or by an absolute 
reference frame (e.g., “north of the lake”) (Levinson, 1996). Languages differ by whether 
they use mostly or exclusively one reference frame (Levinson, 2003). Speakers of 
languages with absolute reference frames would express a location in such terms as “the 
fork is to the south of your foot.” The absolute directions in such languages are not 
necessarily precise. The Tzeltal of Mexico use a word translated as ‘uphill’ to denote 
345° N. Guugu Yimithirr of Australia uses a local ‘north’ to denote 17° N (Majid, 
Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & Levinson, 2004).  
 In light of the above research into the relative effects of language on one’s 
interaction with the physical environment, it would be helpful to investigate how 
different demonstrative systems influence the interpretation of space. One means to 
consider language-specific effects of demonstratives is to look at the use of 
accompanying tools, and demonstratives are ubiquitously expressed with a pointing 
gesture. The concomitant use of gesture with speech may compensate for information not 
expressed in speech and highlight congruent semantic information (Holle & Gunter, 
2007; Wu & Coulson, 2005, 2007). The crossmodal compensation hypothesis or 
Mutually Adaptive Modalities hypothesis (De Ruiter, 2006) views language and gesture 
functioning together in a compensatory relationship to ensure communication. As an 
example that gesture spontaneously complements language, a letter to the editor of the 
New York Times by retired radiologist Steven Sitzman (2013) shares about his wife’s 
temporary paralysis from Guillain-Barré Syndrome, such that after her recovery he was 
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struck by her immediate use of her hands when she spoke.  
There remains much to understand regarding how speech and gesture function 
across languages. Languages may require degrees of gesticulation to express a concept, a 
possibility consistent with the Mutually Adaptive Modalities hypothesis (De Ruiter, 
2006; Melinger & Levelt, 2005), which interprets gestures will complement speech more 
in settings where speech is less effective, such as in a setting with more ambient noise, 
and conversely that gestures are used less when speech is more effective, such as over the 
telephone. Similarly, it has been found that speakers gesture less when their descriptions 
of an object are more detailed (Melinger & Levelt, 2005). When considering the 
Mutually Adaptive Modalities Hypothesis across languages, the informative value of the 
pointing gesture might be predicted to differ. Specifically, Japanese speakers may rely 
less on a pointing gesture to evaluate reference than English speakers, because they have 
more precise lexical means to isolate the intended object. 
Additional theoretical proposals relating visual, verbal, and gestural 
representations are available. The Lexical Semantics Hypothesis (LSH) claims that 
gesture generation stems from the semantics of the lexicon to convey the desired message 
(Butterworth & Hadar, 1989; Schegloff, 1984). The LSH predicts that gestures precisely 
correspond to the specific meaning expressed by the verbal expressions: just as the 
semantics of a word can drive its syntactic position, a demonstrative’s spatial feature will 
generate a gesture to assist in the localization of the referent. Since the gesture results 
from the semantic structure of demonstratives according to the LSH, the absence of a 
pointing gesture with the use of a spatial demonstrative may combine to produce a 
semantic anomaly. By contrast, the Free Imagery Hypothesis assumes that gestures 
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are based on pre-linguistic and non-propositional imagery representations and thus would 
be unaffected by the language production processes that convert the imagistic 
representation into propositional content (Krauss, Chen, & Chawla, 1996; Krauss, Chen, 
& Gottesman, 2000).  
The three hypotheses above regarding speech and gesture co-occurrence describe 
spontaneous production, yet perception of demonstrative use can offer information 
regarding the production of gesture if the expectations of the observer are not met. The 
hypotheses are also not concerned with the electrophysiological responses generated in a 
perceptual paradigm using expected and unexpected pairings of gesture and language, but 
their claims frame questions of the cognitive processes of demonstrative use in different 
languages and with gesture. Gestures both impact a language user’s production and 
inform comprehension, and gesture handling requires cognitive processes to mediate the 
different knowledge levels including motor skills, the choice of linguistic expressions, 
and social intentions (Kelly, Manning, & Rodak, 2008; Kendon, 2004; McNeill, 1992). 
 As with the project described in Chapter 3, the cross-linguistic study discussed 
presently also sought to investigate the brain mechanisms behind coordinating speech, 
space, and gesture by comparing event-related potentials (ERPs) time-locked to the onset 
of an audio demonstrative expression, which was simultaneously presented with an 
artificial visual scene including a speaker, a hearer, and the referent object. The 
combination of the audio demonstrative with the visual scene was classified as either 
congruent or incongruent based on the expectation from traditional accounts of 
demonstratives in English and Japanese indicating relative distance (Aoyama, 1995; 
Halliday & Hasan, 1979; Lyons, 1977; Matsushita, 1901; Quirk, 1979; Sakuma, 1936). In 
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addition to the spatial position of the object of reference to the interlocutors, another 
parameter of interest was the presence or absence of a pointing gesture in the visual 
scenes. The basic premise in adopting the perceptual experimental paradigm and 
manipulating gestural presence is in line with the cognitive computational model for 
embodied gesture processing (Sadehipour & Kopp, 2011). Production models of gesture 
and language can be addressed through their perceptual interpolations, as the product of 
the cognitive processes involved is observable behavior that can be evaluated by an 
interlocutor (and language learner) and serves as the data driving language production. 
 In the previous study (Stevens & Zhang, 2013), the mismatch effect between 
lexical form and visual context produced a late N400 effect (525-725 ms) when a 
demonstrative was presented in an incongruent context with shared gaze within arm’s 
reach of the hearer, and the associated scalp topography and source localization 
corresponded with the patterns uncovered from other N400 studies of semantic or 
contextual anomaly (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980, 1984). Several other ERP studies have also 
addressed congruent and incongruent gesture use with verbal expressions (Cornejo et al., 
2009; Gredebäck, Melinder, & Daum, 2010; Holle & Gunter, 2007; Kelly et al., 2004, 
2007; Özyürek et al., 2007; Wu & Coulson, 2005, 2007). However, none of the existing 
ERP studies addressed brain mechanisms governing the use of spatial demonstratives in 
different languages. 
This investigation had three specific objectives. (1) To investigate whether an 
unexpected spatial context for a demonstrative will elicit the N400-like congruency effect 
(i.e., significant differences between the congruent and incongruent trials) in both English 
and Japanese subject groups for the trials with a pointing gesture. (2) To examine how the 
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behavioral and ERP responses are affected by the absence of a pointing gesture. (3) To 
compare the findings in English and Japanese for the waveform morphology, latency, and 
topographical distribution of the N400 or P600 responses. The first hypothesis is that 
participants from both language groups recognize unexpected demonstrative use partly on 
the basis of relative distance, and therefore a congruency effect should be observed in 
both English and Japanese behavioral reaction time data (i.e., longer response time for 
incongruent trials than for congruent trials) as well as by a N400-like ERP component. 
An N400-like component was observed in the previous study (Stevens & Zhang, 2013) 
but has been elicited elsewhere by both linguistic and non-linguistic stimuli when 
participants are exposed to surprising contexts, which may depend on semantic or 
pragmatic knowledge (Hagoort et al., 2004; Van Berkum, Zwitserlood, Hagoort, & 
Brown, 2003; West & Holcomb, 2002; Wu & Coulson, 2005). A second hypothesis was 
that speakers of one language would be more sensitive to a referential gesture than those 
of another language if there are fewer lexical resources by which to describe spatial 
relations. In particular, English speakers' behavioral and brain responses would be more 
affected by the absence of a pointing gesture than among Japanese speakers, as English 
has fewer demonstrative forms and may therefore depend more on extra-linguistic 
information. This hypothesis, if confirmed, would be in line with the Mutually Adaptive 
Modalities Hypothesis, which considers speech and gesture to supplement each other for 
the benefit of efficient communication. This hypothesis would be also consistent with the 
Lexical Semantics Hypothesis, as an indexical gesture would be understood to be 
generated from the semantics of the associated demonstrative expression. In contrast, if a 
pointing gesture or its absence did not significantly modulate brain responses in either 
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subject group, the data would be consistent with the Free Imagery Hypothesis, as gesture 
functioned as a pre-linguistic symbol. 
Although the prediction preceding the project was that incongruent audiovisual 
pairings would produce an N400 effect, another possible ERP effect to consider for the 
present match/mismatch experiment is a P600, a broad, positive voltage change peaking 
at approximately 600 ms post-stimulus elicited not only by morphosyntactic anomalies 
(Hagoort et al., 1993; Kaan, Harris, Gibson, & Holcomb, 2000; Osterhout, Holcomb, & 
Swinney, 1994), but also by special cases of semantic violations including picture-
expression mismatch (Kim & Osterhout, 2005; Kuperberg et al., 2003; Nieuwland & Van 
Berkum, 2005; Vissers, Kolk, van de Meerendonk, & Chwilla, 2008). Given the 
formulaic co-occurrence of speech and gesture in a demonstration, the use of a 
demonstrative form for spatial reference without the accompanying gesture may 
constitute a violation of the embodied grammar for gesticulation and thereby elicit a 
P600. Alternatively, according to the online Monitoring Theory (Vissers et al., 2008), the 
P600 reflects not just syntactic or structural integration but a more general monitoring 
mechanism to track potential conflicts or processing errors regarding the expected 
representation and input information. According to this more general interpretation of the 
P600, the congruency effect in the present study could result in a late positive effect to 
index the participants’ recognition of a mismatch between a linguistic expression and the 
context for which it forms an expected pattern. 
 
 
 
   84 
 84
4.2. Methods. 
4.2.1. Participants. 
The study followed the informed consent protocol approved by the Institutional Review 
Board. Twelve adult native English and twelve adult native Japanese speakers were 
recruited via advertisement. The English speakers (6 males and 6 females) had all had 
some formal exposure to other language instruction, and the Japanese speakers (5 males 
and 7 females) were all born in Japan and were conversant in English. All participants 
were university undergraduate students or graduates with the average age at 29. The 
Edinburgh handedness inventory index score, averaged across subjects, was +0.85 (right-
handed) (Oldfield, 1971). There were significant differences in age, handedness scores 
between the two subject groups. All subjects reported to have normal or correct normal 
vision without color blindness and had normal hearing. No subjects had any speech or 
language disorders. They were paid $25 each for their time. Data from four participants 
(two English-speaking subjects and two Japanese-speaking subjects) were excluded due 
to excessive blinking and other muscular artifacts. 
 
4.2.2. Stimuli. 
As detailed regarding the experiment described in Chapter 3, the auditory stimuli were 
similarly synthesized using AT&T text-to-speech software and then digitally edited with 
Sound Forge 9 (Sony Corp.). The root mean square intensity levels were normalized for 
the auditory samples. The visual stimuli were made from the Second Life software, 
which provided a virtual world platform with 3D images (http://secondlife.com). The 
images contained varied spatial configurations of the speaker, the hearer, and the referent 
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object:  a flamingo, table, chair, or lamp (see an example in Fig. 4.1), in which the object 
was either near the speaker, near the hearer, or farther than both than they were to each 
other. Gesture use was also varied, such that in half the image, the speaker (the male 
figure in the images) was pointing to the referent, and in the other half the speaker is not 
gesturing. The visual scenes in the audiovisual combinations were identical for the two 
subject groups. 
 
Fig. 4.1.  Visual stimuli, with gesture and without gesture. (a) An example of a visual 
scene for the gesture trials. The male speaker is pointing at an object that is distant to 
both the speaker and hearer. (b) An example of a visual scene for the no-gesture trials. 
The speaker refers to the distant object without an accompanying pointing gesture. 
 
4.2.3. Procedure. 
The audio and visual stimuli were simultaneously presented in each trial to test the 
congruency effect (Fig. 4.2) (Stevens & Zhang, 2013). The audio-visual stimuli were 
presented with the EEvoke® software (ANT Inc., the Netherlands). The pictures were 
displayed for a duration of 2250 ms on a 19” ViewSonic LCD monitor (1280×1024 at 60 
Hz) located approximately one meter in front of the participant with the center and top of 
monitor at level with the subject’s eyes. Each picture in an audiovisual trial was shown 
for 2,250 ms, which was longer than the audio file to allow timely judgment. Sounds 
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were presented binaurally via inserted earphones (Etymotic Research ER-3A) at 60 dB 
sensation level calibrated according to an individual’s hearing threshold (Rao et al., 
2010). The inter-trial interval was 750 ms (Fig. 4.2). 
 
Fig. 4.2. Schema of simultaneous audiovisual presentation protocol. 
 
The subjects sat comfortably in an acoustically and electrically treated room (Acoustic 
Systems) and spent approximately one hour to complete the experiment in four sessions 
with breaks. Instructions to the subject were that a male figure would be referring to an 
object (a flamingo, table, chair, or lamp) in the visual scene on the computer monitor. A 
male voice expressed either “this N” or “that N” (where N = flamingo, table, chair, or 
lamp) in the English paradigm or “kono N,” “sono N,” or “ano N” in the Japanese 
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paradigm (where N = the Japanese translation of one of the four objects). Subjects were 
familiarized with the experimental task with a two-minute practice session, during which 
all the different types of audiovisual combinations were presented.  
The varied parameters included three different relative spatial positions of 
speaker, hearer, and referent object; the presence or absence of a pointing gesture; and the 
demonstrative forms. Congruent pairings consisted of “this” or “kono” when the object 
was in speaker-near space, “that” or “sono” in hearer-near space, and “that” or “ano” for 
distant objects. Incongruent pairings consisted of all other arrangements. For example, if 
the male figure was pointing to a lamp beside him and the auditory stimulus was “this 
lamp” in English or “kono ranpu” in Japanese, the combination would be classified as a 
congruent pairing. If the auditory stimulus was instead “that lamp,” “sono ranpu,” or “ano 
ranpu,” the presentation would be classified as an incongruent pairing. The gesture 
parameter was not used to determine congruency but served as an independent variable. 
The four trial conditions (congruent and incongruent in the presence of gesture, 
congruent and incongruent in the absence of gesture) were each presented 80 times in a 
random order. The subjects were instructed to press one of two keyboard buttons 
(DirectIN-PCB keyboard by Empirisoft Corp.) to indicate “yes” or “no” that the picture 
and the auditory verbal expression formed an expected pairing. Subjects were fitted with 
a 64-channel Waveguard cap, with shielded wires for its Ag/AgCl electrodes. The EEG 
cap contained a silicon ring for conductive gel for each electrode. The impedance of the 
electrodes was maintained at a maximum of 5 kOhm. The electrodes on the EEG cap 
were configured to match the International 10-20 Montage System and intermediate 
locations. The EEG data were recorded with the Advanced Neuro Technology system 
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(http://www.ant-neuro.com/). The AFz electrode served as the ground. The common 
average of the connected unipolar electrodes of the ANT amplifier served as the default 
reference. The sampling rate was 512 Hz. The bandpass for EEG recording was set 
between 0.016 and 200 Hz. The ERP event markers were time-locked to the onset of the 
audiovisual presentation in each trial. 
 
4.2.4. Behavioral data analysis. 
Behavioral response and reaction times were recorded for each subject. Since the pairings 
of visual scene and demonstrative expression were classified as either a congruent or 
incongruent response according to the distance-based definitions in each language 
(Aoyama, 1995; Matsushita, 1901; Sakuma, 1936; Halliday & Hasan, 1979; Lyons, 1977; 
Quirk, 1979), participants’ responses were counted in terms of conformity rate to the 
conventional usage. A “correct” response would therefore be agreement (“yes”) with a 
congruent pairing or disagreement (“no”) for an incongruent pairing. Mean reaction times 
for each condition were also calculated for each subject. Mixed repeated-measure 
ANOVA tests were performed to test three main factors and their interaction:  subject 
group (English vs. Japanese), gesture (presence vs. absence), and congruency (congruent 
vs. incongruent). In the case of significant interactions, further two-tailed t-tests were 
applied for the factors of interest. 
 
4.2.5. ERP data analysis. 
As in the previous study (Stevens & Zhang, 2013), the off-line ERP analysis was 
performed with the ASA 4.7 package (Advanced Source Analysis, ANT Corp.) with 
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common average reference. The choice of common average reference is in line with 
recommendation for EEG recordings with 64 or more electrodes (Curran, Tucker, Kutas, 
& Posner, 1993; Picton et al., 2000) and deemed appropriate for the analysis of N400 or 
P600 responses (Hamm, Johnson, & Kirk, 2002; Lau, Stroud, Plesch, & Philips, 2006; 
Lim, Padmala, & Pessoa, 2009), even though earlier studies using fewer electrodes 
typically employed the mastoid (or linked mastoids) reference. The ERP epochs were 900 
ms long, including a 100 ms pre-stimulus baseline. Trials with peaks exceeded µ50 µV in 
amplitude were rejected as artifact. A bandpass filter (0.5~40 Hz) was applied. A 
minimum of 50 good trials per condition was required for a subject to be included in ERP 
averaging and statistical analysis. 
To determine the time windows for the ERP components of interest, a Bonferroni-
corrected point-to-point t-test was applied in comparing the congruent and incongruent 
conditions at the midline parietal Pz electrode (cf. Gunter, Friederici, & Schriefers, 2000; 
Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). An area analysis of selected time windows was chosen, rather 
than peak analysis, because the ERP responses of our current interest occurred in 
relatively late time windows and showed slow, broad deflections rather than sharp peaks 
(Stevens & Zhang, 2013).   
The electrodes were grouped into nine electrode regions (Fig. 4.3). Similar 
regional groupings of electrodes have been used in previous ERP studies (Rao et al., 
2010; Stevens & Zhang, 2013; Zhang et al., 2011). At the anterior scalp, a left frontal 
(LF) group included F4, F6, F8, FC6, C6, and TP8. A right frontal (RF) group included 
the electrodes opposite to the LF group. A frontal-mid-central (FMC) group included 
FC1, FC2, C3, and C4. A Left temporal-parietal (LTP) group TP8, CP6, CP4, P8, P6, and 
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P4, and a right temporal-parietal (RTP) group included the right hemisphere counterparts. 
A group of midline electrodes in the parietal region (MID) included CPz, CP1, CP2, Pz, 
P1, and P2. A left parietal-occipital (LPO) included PO8, PO6, PO4, and O2. A right 
parietal-occipital (RPO) group covered the opposite sites on the right hemisphere. A 
midline parietal-occipital (MPO) group included POz and Oz. 
 
 
Fig. 4.3. Grouped electrode sites of interest. Sites are based on a realistic MRI-based head 
model. 
 
A two-tailed point-to-point t-test with a Bonferroni correction was performed on 
the averaged ERP waveform data of the selected electrode sites. The t-test was applied to 
analyze differences between the congruent and incongruent conditions across time 
(Guthrie & Buchwald, 1991; Zhang et al., 2011). The responses were collapsed across the 
proximal and distal demonstratives respectively for the gesture condition and no-gesture 
condition so that the combined physical properties of the audio and visual stimuli were 
identical to avoid the confounding factor of physical stimulus difference in the congruent-
incongruent comparison (Stevens & Zhang, 2013). An ERP congruency effect in this 
study would be defined as showing a significant difference (p < 0.05) that persisted for at 
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least 40 ms (Zhang et al., 2011).   
Additionally, ANOVA tests were performed using Systat (Version 12) statistics 
software with the following main factors: subject group, congruency, gesture, and 
electrode region. Post-hoc tests were performed for individual electrode regions when a 
congruency effect was found during a time interval. Laterality effects were tested by 
comparing right hemisphere sites (RF, RTP, RPO) and left hemisphere sites (LF, LTP, 
LPO). The Global Field Power (GFP) was calculated in order to consider overall 
differences in electric potential for all 64 electrodes at every sampling point of the epoch 
window (Hamburger & Burgt, 1991; Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980). Sampling points for 
both the congruent and incongruent conditions were translated into z scores relative to the 
100 ms baseline GFP activity (Rao et al., 2010). Significant effects were taken into 
account when the differences (p < 0.01) persisted for at least 40 ms. 
 
4.3. Results. 
4.3.1. Behavioral data. 
The reaction times showed consistent congruency effect in both subject groups regardless 
of the presence or absence of gesture. In the English data, incongruent presentations 
resulted in longer reaction times (F(1,9) = 16.6, p < 0.01). The Japanese reaction time 
data showed a similar congruency effect (F(1,9) = 26.5, p < 0.001). While there was no 
significant effect for the three main factors in the accuracy data, a significant three-way 
interaction of gesture x congruency x subject group was found (F(1,18) = 21.7, p < 
0.001). The interaction of gesture and language was also significant (F(1,18) = 11.3, p < 
0.01). Both English and Japanese participants showed consistent judgment (95% and 
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above) in the congruent condition. Incongruent presentations with gesture also produced 
similar rejection rates in the two subject groups, approximately 70% for both groups. A 
language effect was found for the trials without an accompanying gesture, in which the 
English speakers showed a larger conformity rate difference between the congruent and 
incongruent trials than the Japanese speakers (t = 2.37, p < 0.05) (Fig. 4.4). 
 
 
Fig. 4.4. Behavioral data showing reaction time and percentage of conformity. Data 
include congruent and incongruent trials in the two subject groups. 
 
4.3.2. ERP data. 
Three time windows were selected: 325-385 ms, 400-500 ms, and 500-775 ms, based on 
the significant differences in point-to-point t-tests performed on data from the Pz 
electrode. Mixed ANOVA tests included four main factors: language (or subject group), 
congruency, gesture, and electrode site. Planned comparisons in repeated-measures 
ANOVA were further performed for the two languages separately to identify 
contributions from each subject group. 
In the 325-385 ms time interval, multiple significant interaction effects were 
found, including four-way interaction of subject group, congruency, gesture, and 
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electrode site (F(8,144) = 5.4, p < 0.01). The three-way interaction of gesture x 
congruency x electrode site was also significant (F(8,144) = 6.3, p < 0.001), as was the 
interaction of subject group x gesture x congruency (F(1,18 ) = 12.8, p < 0.01) and the 
two-way interaction of gesture x congruency (F(1,18) = 9.2, p < 0.01). 
The English and Japanese data were then tested separately with ANOVA. The 
English data showed a significant interaction of gesture and congruency (F(1,9) = 16.2, p 
< 0.01). Further analyses were performed for the gesture trials and no-gesture trials 
separately. In the gesture trials, the interaction between congruency and electrode site 
was significant when a gesture was present (F(8,72) = 4.6, p < 0.001). Post-hoc t-test 
analysis of the electrode sites showed a significant congruency effect at MPO with a 
negative deflection (t(9) = -4.4, p < 0.01) (Fig. 4.5). The Japanese data did not show 
significant effects in the early window of 325-385 ms for the gesture trials (Fig 4.6). 
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Fig. 4.5. Grand average English ERP data for gesture trials. Shaded areas indicate 
minimally 40 ms time intervals where the point-to-point t-test was significant [p < 0.05]. 
Topographical maps shown for congruent, incongruent, and difference between 
conditions. 
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Fig. 4.6. Grand average Japanese ERP data for the gesture trials. Shaded areas indicate 
significant congruent vs. incongruent differences using the same convention as in Figure 
4.5. Topographical maps shown for congruent, incongruent, and difference between 
conditions. 
 
In the no-gesture trials in English, the congruency effect was significant, (F(1,9 ) = 40.0, 
p < 0.001). There was also an interaction of congruency x electrode site (F(8,72) = 4.7, p 
< 0.001). In particular, congruency effects were found at LFC (t(9) = -4.8, p < 0.001) and 
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RFC (t(9) = -3.5, p <.01). In these frontal channel groupings, the incongruent condition 
consistently has a more negative ERP response than the congruent condition. In the 
posterior channels, there were significant congruent effects at MID (t(9) = -4.2, p < 0.01) 
and MPO (t(9) = -4.6, p < 0.01) (Fig. 4.7). Like the gesture trials, the no-gesture trials in 
Japanese did not show any effect for demonstrative use for the 325-385 ms time window 
(Fig. 4.8). 
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Fig. 4.7. Grand average English ERP for the no-gesture trials. Shaded areas indicate 
significant congruent vs. incongruent differences using the same convention as in Figure 
4.5. Topographical maps shown for congruent, incongruent, and difference between 
conditions. 
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Fig. 4.8. Grand average Japanese ERP data for no-gesture trials. Topographical maps 
shown for congruent, incongruent, and difference between conditions. 
 
In the 400-500 ms time window, the mixed ANOVA test showed significant 
interaction of gesture x congruency x electrode site (F(8,144) = 4,5, p < 0.05). The 
gesture trials showed no significant effects in either English or Japanese data. For the no-
gesture trials, the English data alone showed a main congruency effect (F(1,9) = 8.8, p < 
0.05). In particular, the congruency effect was found at LFC (t(9) = -3.3, p < 0.01), RFC 
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(t(9) = -2.7, p < 0.05), FMC (t(9) = -2.8, p < 0.05), LPO (t(9) = -2.7, p < 0.05) with a 
more negative deflection for the incongruent pairings. A congruency effect with a 
positive deflection was found at MID (t(9) = -2.5, p < 0.05), and at MPO (t(9) = -2.3, p < 
0.05) (Fig. 7). Like the gesture trials, the Japanese data for the no-gesture trials showed 
no significant effects in the 400-500 ms window (Fig. 4.8). 
In the 500-775 ms time, mixed ANOVA test showed significant interactions of 
subject group x congruency x gesture x electrode site (F(8,144) = 4.5, p < 0.05) and 
subject group x congruency (F(1,18) = 4.4, p < 0.05). In the gesture trials, there was no 
significant effect in the English data. The Japanese data showed a congruency effect for 
the gesture trials (F(1,9) = 4.9, p = 0.05) (Fig. 4.6). The right hemisphere showed larger 
negative deflections than the left (F(1,9) = 5.9, p < 0.05). Site-specific tests showed the 
congruency effect at RTP (t(9) = -4.2, p < 0.01) and RPO (t(9) = -2.9, p < 0.05) for the 
trials that included a gesture for the Japanese subjects. In the no-gesture trials, only the 
English data showed a congruency effect with a positive deflection observed at MID (t(9) 
= 3.0, p < 0.05), LPO (t(9) = -2.9, p < 0.05), RPO (t(9) = -3.4, p < 0.01), and MPO (t(9) = 
-3.6, p < 0.01) (Fig. 4.7). The no-gesture trials did not show a congruency effect in the 
Japanese group (Fig. 4.8). 
The GFP data showed time windows with significant differences between the 
congruent and incongruent conditions in the two subject groups (Fig. 4.9). In the gesture 
trials, significant differences were found among English-speaking participants at 262-322 
ms and 398-473 ms. In contrast, Japanese speakers showed significant differences later at 
500-551 ms, 596-645 ms, and from 717 ms. In the no gesture trials, the English data 
showed significant differences during the following intervals: 168-322 ms, 398-473 ms, 
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484-551 ms, and 586-645 ms, and the Japanese data showed a significant congruency 
effect during the 717-760 ms time window. 
 
Fig. 4.9. Global Field Power data from the two subject groups and gesture conditions. 
Shaded areas indicate significant congruent vs. incongruent differences using the same 
convention as in Figure 4.5. 
 
4.4. Discussion. 
The perceptual experiment on the use of spatial demonstratives and gesture brings us 
closer toward understanding how humans interpret the physical environment when 
communicating thought. The present data offer new findings regarding the 
electrophysiological markers of embodied gestural processing and visual spatial 
processing in connection with referential expressions. Consistent with predictions and 
other published work (Stevens & Zhang, 2013), an N400-like effect was observed for the 
gesture trials and longer reaction times were recorded when demonstratives did not match 
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participants’ expectations for a given spatial configuration of discourse participants and 
referent object in both English and Japanese. When the pointing gesture was removed 
from the trials, English speakers’ data showed a significant positive P600-like deflection 
for the incongruent trials. But no such significant ERP effect was observed the Japanese 
subject group although reaction times were increased in the incongruent trials for both 
subject groups regardless of the presence or absence of gesture. The cross-linguistic ERP 
data during the no-gesture trials suggest that speakers of separate languages may rely on 
extra-linguistic cues to different degrees, possibly because of the specificity expressed in 
the lexicon. 
 Of the different interpretations of gesture use, the data here are most consistent 
with the Mutually Adaptive Modalities Hypothesis and the Lexical Semantics 
Hypothesis. The data do not support the Free Imagery Hypothesis, which considers 
gestures to be “pre-linguistic” symbols. In support of the Mutually Adaptive Modalities 
hypothesis, it was found that speakers of different languages showed varied reliance on 
gesture. The data further suggest that language itself is one determinant in a user’s 
expectation for a pointing gesture. Caution is necessary here as the theoretical accounts 
only make claims about how people produce gestures in certain contexts, not how they 
will perceive gestures in the same settings. If gesture comprehension (or expectation of 
gesture use) directly relies on one’s knowledge of gesture production in the context of 
spatial demonstrative use, greater reliance on gestures in production would lead to 
increased expectation of gestural presence in the visual scenes in the present study. 
Both subject groups consistently showed a significant congruency effect (i.e., 
differences between the congruent and incongruent conditions) in the behavioral data 
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when a pointing gesture was used with the spatial demonstratives. The incongruent 
demonstrative use in both languages led to a longer reaction time, suggesting that the 
subjects expected the demonstrative use to conform to the proximal-distal distinction in 
English or the distance-based three-way ko-so-a distinction in Japanese. Additional 
support for the argument that English and Japanese speakers expect for demonstrative use 
to conform to some spatial configuration comes from their acceptability judgments. The 
congruent condition, that is, where the demonstrative form conformed to the binary 
proximal-distal distinction in English or the tertiary ko-so-a system in Japanese, was 
accepted by participants with a very high rate of “yes” judgment at over 95%. The rate of 
“no” judgment for the incongruent trials was more variable. Both subject groups rejected 
most incongruent trials when a gesture was present. In the no-gesture trials, Japanese 
speakers rejected incongruent audiovisual pairings to a high degree (84%), and English 
speakers rejected incongruent trials at a lower rate (53%). The lower rate of rejection 
among English speakers may suggest more difficulty or ambiguity in decision making. If 
English speakers rely on a co-occurring gesture in spatial reference resolution more than 
Japanese speakers, then the relatively lower rejection rate for English speakers could 
indicate that the English subjects did not have enough information to evaluate a 
demonstration without that act containing the overt pointing cue. The acceptability data 
for the no-gesture trials also indicate that English speakers showed a stronger bias toward 
classifying trials as congruent, something not observed among Japanese speakers’ 
conformity rates. Thus the proximal-distal distinction alone does not explain 
demonstrative use in English. The manner in which a pointing gesture affected 
participants’ decisions suggests gestures play an important role in demonstrative 
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reference resolution. Japanese speakers, by contrast, may have been able to assess a 
similar linguistic act with sufficient information provided by their demonstrative lexicon 
and the spatial context without an additional indexical gesture. Together, these findings 
suggest that English and Japanese speakers rely on a pointing gesture differently to judge 
a referential act, such that this extra-linguistic tool appears more informative to English 
speakers to limit the possible domain of reference. The domains of usage of the 
demonstrative forms in English and Japanese did appear to correlate with the relative 
positions of the speaker and hearer, a finding consistent with model of control space, such 
that relative proximity would afford an agent more action possibilities toward an object. 
English and Japanese therefore have both lexical and extra-linguistic tools to delineate a 
referential space, and demonstrative forms coincided with discourse participants’ position 
to interact with an object. 
The ERP data supported the first prediction that unexpected pairings of 
demonstratives and visual scenes based on proximity in the presence of a pointing gesture 
would elicit an N400-like response for the congruency effect in both the English and 
Japanese subjects. As predicted according to the second hypothesis, there was also a 
language effect. The English data showed the N400-like effect after 300 ms in the 
midline posterior occipital region (MPO), and in the Japanese data the effect was in right 
posterior regions at a later latency. Although the Japanese data do not show a significant 
congruency effect at MPO, the scalp distributions are broadly similar in the two 
languages (Figs. 4.5 & 4.6). The GFP data confirmed the between-subject differences in 
the latency of the N400-like response for the congruency effect in the gesture trials (Figs. 
4.5, 4.6, & 4.9). One plausible explanation would be that participants from the two 
   104 
 104
language subject groups employed separate strategies to process the visual and auditory 
information online in developing an evaluation of the trial. For instance, Kelly, Kravitz, 
and Hopkins (2004) found an N400 waveform following an early sensory effect 
bilaterally in occipital and frontal sites when speech was presented with incongruent 
gestures. The authors conclude that hand gestures are integrated with spoken language at 
both early and late phases of processing. In the present study, speakers of Japanese and 
English may indeed interface differently with space to decide the appropriateness of a 
demonstrative expression with the pointing gesture, weighing elements of the spatial 
context differently due to the binary vs. tertiary lexical distinctions. The late broad 
negative waveform in the posterior electrode sites for the incongruent trials is consistent 
with previous N400 literature (Hagoort, Brown, & Swaab, 1996; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980; 
Lau, Stroud, Plesch, & Philips, 2008). Similar late N450 response has been reported for 
congruency effects involving iconic gestures (Wu & Coulson, 2007), and the study 
described in Chapter 3 also found a prolonged latency (Stevens & Zhang, 2013). 
Presumably, the task of integrating a spatial scene with semantic information may 
demand more cognitive resources than straight anomalies presented word by word in 
sentence form without any additional spatial processing. The ERP latency differences for 
the congruency effect, interestingly, did not directly translate into behavioral reaction 
time differences between the two subject groups. The online neural responses to 
incongruency may be a more sensitive indicator than the later motor action for decision 
making. Alternatively, the reaction time data and the ERP latency differences may not 
index the same processing stage or cognitive effort in time. The participants were 
required to make a “yes” or “no” decision if a demonstrative expression and a visual 
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scene were matched up properly. The decision process involved responding to the 
naturalness of the physical stimuli, the linguistic act, and a categorical decision of trial 
acceptability. The richness of the stimuli likely led to variable ERP latencies at a different 
time window, which might not shift in tandem with behavioral reaction at a later window. 
The ERP data revealed differences in the language factor (English vs. Japanese) 
as well as in the gesture factor (no-gesture vs. gesture). Unlike the posterior negative 
deflection for the gesture trials, the no-gesture ERP morphology and scalp distribution 
showed a different pattern for the congruency effect in the English data. The broad 
positive-going waveform at centroparietal sites that peaked approximately at post-
stimulus 600 ms window indicated a P600-like effect (Hagoort et al., 1999; Kuperberg, 
2007). The Japanese data, however, did not show such P600 congruency effect for the 
no-gesture trials despite the existence of the significant congruency effect at the 
behavioral level. The GFP data for the P600 effect were consistent with the waveform 
analysis (Fig. 4.9). 
The P600 has been observed with ungrammatical syntactic construction and with 
semantic violations of verb-argument agreement as well as picture-sentence mismatch 
(Kuperberg, 2007; Vissers et al., 2008). In the present context, a positive deflection of the 
waveforms was observed in trials missing the pointing gesture for the English-speaking 
subject group. One interpretation is that demonstrative reference in English may depend 
on an expected structural pattern involving a linguistic form and physical context. The 
P600 has also been similarly observed for structural violations such as musical phrases 
that ended in out-of-key chords (Patel, Gibson, Ratner, Besson, & Holcomb, 1998). The 
structural conformity account could readily explain the generation of the P600 response, 
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assuming that both speech and pointing gesture are integral components required by a 
multimodal embodied grammar.  
Another plausible interpretation for the English-specific P600 in the present study 
is available with the Error Monitoring Model (van de Meerendonk, Kolk, Chwilla, & 
Vissers, C, 2009; van de Meerendonk, Kolk, Vissers, & Chwilla, 2010). According to this 
account, the P600 does not just reflect syntactic processing but instead is a general index 
of reanalysis. In this reanalysis process, the subject detects an error and attempts to edit 
the previous input to resolve a perceived conflict. The Error Monitoring Model for the 
"semantic P600" could offer an explanation for why the positive ERP effect was 
observed in a context (an incongruent demonstrative used to refer to an object without an 
accompanying gesture) that may require reanalysis in order to make a cognitive decision.  
The language-specific P600 in relation to the absence of a pointing gesture during 
a demonstration suggests different processing mechanisms in the two populations of 
language users. The English subjects reanalyzed the visual input with an expected 
pointing gesture use to interpret the demonstration meaningfully. For the Japanese 
subjects, other contextual cues, such as joint gaze and relative distance in relation to the 
tertiary demonstrative system, may outweigh the pointing gesture in their congruency 
judgment under the present perceptual paradigm. The lack of a P600 response in the 
Japanese group suggests an influence from the language system on participants’ 
perception and production of demonstrative language.  
These cross-linguistic differences in the influence of gesture on speech 
comprehension indicate that speech and gesture influence each other to achieve the 
communicative goal. When that goal is demonstrative reference, the explicitness of 
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information in one modality seems to compensate for under-specification by other means, 
a conclusion in line with the Mutually Adaptive Modalities hypothesis (De Ruiter, 2006). 
Pertinently for the use of demonstratives, the variable socio-linguistic reliance on a 
pointing gesture between English and Japanese speakers suggests that possibilities for 
interaction with an object can be understood by language users both by lexical as well as 
other physical means.  
 Lastly, of unknown significance, a negative ERP waveform difference between 
the congruent and incongruent conditions was observed in the English data before 350 
ms. This early bilateral effect was accompanied with a late P600-like effect specific to 
the English subjects. The frontal electrode sites showed a negative deflection, and the 
central electrodes showed polarity reversal. The scalp distribution of the early effect did 
not resemble topographical patterns of vertical or horizontal eye movement. It is also 
different from a P2 effect in terms of waveform morphology and scalp topography, which 
was previously reported in tasks of image and language processing (Federmeier & Kutas, 
2002). The latency of the early ERP response was similar to that of the ELAN (Early Left 
Anterior Negativity) (Friederici & Frisch, 2000). However, the ELAN is known more to 
track grammatical violations than semantic or contextual anomalies and is lateralized to 
the left. We can speculate that the early congruency effect in the present study could 
reflect differential sensory processing of the complex visual-spatial computation of the 
relative positions of objects for the congruent and incongruent trials in the absence of the 
pointing gesture. 
 The limitations of the study are important to appreciate, including the small 
sample size of speakers of English and Japanese. A larger sample size of subjects would 
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be helpful to increase the power of the study. In future studies, it would be helpful to test 
speakers of other languages with different demonstrative systems. Coventry et al. (2008) 
have found, for example, that Spanish and English speakers use the proximal 
demonstrative (“este,” “this”) differently in each language. Also, English and Chinese 
show many differences in the use of spatial demonstratives, even though both languages 
use the binary demonstrative system (Wu, 2004). To further understand the cross-
linguistic commonalities and differences in the use of deictic expressions and nonverbal 
gestures in communication, it would be helpful to study with similar methods languages 
with unique demonstrative systems, such as Malagasy, which includes expressions for 
different spatial contexts depending on whether the object is visible.   
Another limitation of the present project has to do with the difficulty of 
reconstructing naturalistic referential act for social interaction in an experimental setting. 
There is lack of ecological validity in the experimental design (Brewer, 2000; Locke, 
1986). The conclusions are drawn regarding linguistic intuitions from participants 
engaged in unnatural activities: making binary acceptability decisions by striking a 
computer key, looking at static images of gesturing instead of the normal dynamic 
motion, observing a demonstration divorced from greater discourse, and especially seeing 
the artificial setup of combining a demonstrative with a visual scene that does not have 
any accompanying gesture. Future work should aim for more naturalistic stimuli and 
settings including the animated gestures. Practically, aspects of the experimental design 
in a laboratory setting must differ from the typical real life experiences as strict 
experimental control needs to be exercised at the expense of realism. ERP studies have 
historically made use of abstract and de-contextualized experiment materials in a 
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paradigm of expectancy violation. For example, a P600 experiment for syntactic 
processing may present words one at a time on a screen and string together strange word 
sequences that one almost never encounters in real life. Nevertheless, the violation 
paradigm remains the dominant, time-tested method in ERP research and has revealed 
important findings about the brain mechanism underlying cognitive, linguistic and social 
processes. 
Basic questions regarding the nature of demonstrative reference can be pursued in 
an experimental setting, such as measuring the electrophysiological responses to 
unexpected demonstrative use according to the setting or an accompanying gesture. A 
definitive answer is not supplied by the present initial work in English and Japanese, but 
the results here highlight some of the complexity underlying an everyday and essential 
part of verbal communication. In the last chapter, which follows, I will briefly discuss the 
nature of a demonstrative as a single-use name, synthesize the findings presented thus far, 
and suggest new paths for such work and implications in clinical settings. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Naming for control and disposal 
 
5.1. On the disposable nature of demonstratives. 
If we are to entertain the concept that the use of a demonstrative implies a speaker’s 
possible actions toward an object, then a subsequent question is what unique properties 
would be true of demonstratives, the forms of which suggest the ranking of control 
spaces by which one could interact with an object. I suggest that demonstratives possess a 
disposable property, a quality not shared (or shared much less) by other referring 
expressions, which allows for the release of control over an object in order to refer to new 
objects with the same word. The disposable property of demonstratives means that the 
use of a demonstrative is a singular event, after which the use of the same form would not 
be expected to refer to the same object. Therefore, the ‘disposal’ of the demonstrative’s 
reference involves a new sense of focus and specification with each use of the same 
expression. The control spaces associated with demonstratives are highly dependent on 
context and are dynamic sources of meaning. 
The disposable property of demonstratives is derived from being a deictic use of 
language. Like other deictic language, demonstratives refer to a dynamic world. This 
distinguishes demonstratives from eternal names, e.g., Beatrice, which suggest a static 
world. Eternal names can be used to refer multiple times to an object imagined to be the 
same across contexts. If we were to refer to a baby rabbit as “Beatrice,” the name will 
continue to refer to the animal the next day, as an adolescent, and after a fulfilled life as 
an elderly rabbit:  we pretend that the object is somehow identical across instances of 
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time. If we use the term “this” to refer to a baby rabbit, use of the term “this” the next day 
would not in all likelihood refer to the same object. Demonstratives can be thought of 
therefore as disposable names, as each use of a demonstrative introduces an object into a 
new symbolic relationship. In other words, each demonstration is a new naming event.  
Demonstratives and other names, however, are used similarly in counterfactual 
situations.  Counterfactual situations require that an object persist across possible worlds, 
e.g., “If that [pointing to cup] had been glass, it would have shattered right into the toys.” 
We easily entertain contradictory thoughts where an object simultaneously possesses one 
property (a cup being completely made of plastic) and another, mutually exclusive 
property (an imagined cup made of glass) for demonstratives and other named objects. A 
requirement of object persistence presents a problem for the logical treatment of natural 
language, especially in the use of possible worlds as a model for modal language. A 
referring expression that picks out an object that is understood to persist in all possible 
worlds is a name or, as Kripke also called it, a rigid designator (Kripke, 1972). Although 
the objects are expected to persist, our cup example shows the logical impossibility of 
allowing a named object to inhabit a different possible world and yet be considered the 
same object (that is, for a plastic cup to be glass).   
Because demonstratives refresh their denotation with each use, we can use the 
same form repeatedly to refer to different objects in a way that other referring expressions 
do not produce equally felicitous utterances. To illustrate, let’s imagine a child escorted 
into a candy store by a grandparent eagerly indifferent to the child’s parents’ wishes, 
where we might hear (24), whereas (25) and (26) are less expected, as the child prances 
around the store pointing to different candies (with subscripts to identify different 
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referents). 
 
(24) I want thisi and thisj and thisk and thisl and thism. 
(25) ??I want iti and itj and itk and itl and itm. 
(26) ??I want the candyi and the candyj and the candyk and the candyl and the candym. 
 
A nearly opposite pattern can be seen when a speaker speaks continuously about a single 
referent. Imagine that we are visiting a friend and walking the perimeter of a newly 
bought house.  Consider how relatively felicitously the friend’s utterances (27), (28), and 
(29) serve to describe the new purchase. 
 
(27) ??We got this house for a decent price, and this house has good space, and this 
house is near amenities.   
(28) We got the house for a decent price, and the house has good space, and the house 
is near amenities.  
(29) We got it for a decent price, and it has good space, and it is near amenities.  
 
(27) appears difficult to process, as the use of the demonstrative phrase seems to suggest 
that the referent is changing. (28) seems to cause less difficulty in understanding that the 
referent of “the house” is constant. Of the three utterances, (29) sounds to this author as 
the most natural and (27) the least. Notably, even if the speaker were gesturing to the 
house, this would not significantly improve the acceptability of (27). The examples (24)-
(29) are offered to illustrate how demonstratives are used as disposable names, such that 
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the same referent is not expected to serve as the denotation for a demonstrative after a 
singular use. As such, they should follow a general naming rule. Kripke (1972) described 
the practice of naming as a sort of baptism.  
The ritualistic nature of naming (and thus demonstrative use) will be described 
here according to three rules:  an index rule (30), an assignment rule (31), and a naming 
rule (32). By positing these three rules, a naming event will be understood to require 
three actions: the use of an object (e.g., an arrow) to indicate some set of properties of 
interest; assignment of a name to that set of properties; and acknowledgement that the 
isolated properties now exist as a unique object, respectively. 
 The index rule serves the function of associating the referent with another object. 
It starts with an attempt to isolate some set of properties, Q, by forming a unique 
relationship between it and any object that can serve as an index. It therefore posits some 
function, F, which can have any meaning whatsoever, as long as it connects the indexical 
object uniquely with the set of properties of interest and excludes any other set of 
properties.   
 
(30) The index rule. 
Let i be some entity; and let Q and R be sets of properties; and let Index be a function 
of the form Index(i,Q,F), such that there exists some function F for which the 
following is true: 
∃i,Q,F[[F(Q)  i] ^ [F(i)Q] ^ ∀R[Q≠R   ¬[[F(R)  i] ^ [F(i)  R]]] 
The function that relates a set of properties Q and the indexical object i can be imagined 
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like a string that connects them, and one can start on either end of the string and follow it 
to the other end. The index rule serves to describe the necessity of having some 
instrument (physical, cognitive, etc.) to isolate the set of properties as a figure out of a 
nameless ground. 
 Another rule that is necessary for a naming event is the assignment of the name 
itself. We can consider a rule, (31), where some isolated set of properties, now a referent, 
will be identified by a name that will serve as a constant.  
 
(31) Assignment rule 
Let Q be some set of properties, “name” a property; let Assign be a function such 
that for any Q, Assign(Q,“name”) will bind sign “name” to set Q such that for any 
function, F(“name”)Q 
 
 After having defined a rule to isolate a referent and assign this referent with a 
name, an additional step involves combining the Index rule with Assign rule to posit the 
existence of a uniquely identified object, one that has the exclusive property of having 
been named at any iteration of the Naming rule, (32). 
 
(32) Naming rule 
Let Q and R be sets of properties, “name” a property, and i an entity, such that for 
any set Q and entity i, if the function Index returns as true some unique 
relationship between Q and i and if the function Assign identifies a property (a 
name) with the set Q, then the existence of an object x and property q will be 
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posited and q is only true for Q. 
 ∀Q,R,i[index (i,Q,R) ^ Assign(Q,“name”)  ∃x,q[q(Q) ^ q(x) ^ ¬q(R)]] 
 
The effect of the naming rule in (32) is that when some set of properties is assigned a 
name, one can consider that an object has been formed and that that object has the unique 
property of being named by the rule. The existence of an object, therefore, will depend on 
the role of an observer to separate it from the rest of the universe by giving it a name. 
 The reason for positing a general naming rule such as (32) is that this should serve 
to form the basis of a taxonomy of more specific rules for the demonstrative forms in a 
language. An integral part of the naming rule is that some object serve as an index with 
which to isolate the referent. The nature of this object was not specified in (32), as it is 
assumed that different languages will make use of a diverse number of indices.  
Demonstratives are argued here to be temporary names, and the indexical objects 
for demonstratives would include the associated control space. We could therefore notate 
one index as the first control space, the one highest ranked by the speaker, as i=1’. The 
index as the second control space can be notated as i=2’ and is the next highest ranked by 
the speaker and perhaps the highest estimated for the hearer, if the hearer does not share 
the speaker’s vantage point. If the referent is so distant in space or remote in memory that 
neither the point of view of the speaker nor that of the nearest available point of view 
seems adequate, the referent might be indexed by way of a third, non-local control space 
(i=3’). English demonstratives are therefore catalogued according to the rules in (33), and 
the Japanese forms in (34). 
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(33) 
Rule for ‘this’ 
a.  ∀Q,R[index (1’,Q,R) ^ Assign(Q,“this”)  ∃x,q[q(Q) ^ q(x) ^ ¬q(R)]] 
Rules for ‘that’ 
b. ∀Q,R[index (2’,Q,R) ^ Assign(Q,“that”)  ∃x,q[q(Q) ^ q(x) ^ ¬q(R)]] 
c. ∀Q,R[index (3’,Q,R) ^ Assign(Q,“that”)  ∃x,q[q(Q) ^ q(x) ^ ¬q(R)]] 
Rule for ‘ko’ 
d. ∀Q,R[index (1’,Q,R) ^ Assign(Q,“ko”)  ∃x,q[q(Q) ^ q(x) ^ ¬q(R)]] 
Rule for ‘so’ 
e. ∀Q,R[index (2’,Q,R) ^ Assign(Q,“so”)  ∃x,q[q(Q) ^ q(x) ^ ¬q(R)]] 
Rule for ‘a’ 
f. ∀Q,R[index (3’,Q,R) ^ Assign(Q,“a”)  ∃x,q[q(Q) ^ q(x) ^ ¬q(R)]] 
 
It should be stressed when reading the rules in (33) that there appears to be a level 
of symmetry between English and Japanese forms that should not be exaggerated. The 
forms in both languages are indeed related to ranked control spaces in the above naming 
rules, but the boundaries of the control spaces are not necessarily expected to be 
universal. In other words, the boundaries of the second control space may not be the same 
in English and Japanese and indeed should not be expected to be so, considering that 
Japanese includes a unique form for the second control space, whereas English shares a 
form for the second and third control spaces. The problem of dividing the control spaces 
is therefore reminiscent of classifying colors in English and Russian. The rules above 
defining demonstratives incorporate a level of cultural differences in the delineation of a 
control space. We should expect for differences between language communities, 
including reliance on gesture and gaze, to be considered implicitly by the above rules. 
Language communities will differ on their use of extra-linguistic communication, and we 
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would predict that the lexical divisions will be inversely proportional to the richness of 
the non-lexical means to establish a control space. The taxonomy above invites 
investigation into other possible divisions, available in other languages. It would be 
worthwhile to consider new experiments that would address the possibility of more 
elaborate demonstrative systems and tabulate any corresponding poverty of physical 
constraints.  
 
5.2. Synopsis.  
This dissertation has sought to investigate normative behavior associated with 
demonstrative use. Demonstrative forms have been described as conforming to the 
relative distance to the speaker (Anderson & Keenan, 1985; Bain, 1879; Greenberg, 
1985; Lyons, 1977), but they have also been argued to relate to the attentional state of the 
hearer (Fitzgerald, 1966; Kirsner & van Heuven, 1988; Kirsner, 1977; Strauss, 1993, 
2002). The two studies described in this dissertation project used an ERP technique that 
showed clear evidence that while both claims are true, there are aspects of the 
demonstrative use that are not fully accountable by either claim. 
 Due to the perceived shortcomings in previous descriptive models of 
demonstratives, a new approach has been proposed that demonstrative forms relate to 
how the speaker ranks possible actions toward the referent object. The new proposal 
invokes the idea of control space and argues that a speaker will demonstrate an object 
with an implied suggestion for how the object could be controlled. A space is defined, 
with such tools as a pointing gesture and gaze, in which certain actions may be 
calculated, including grasping, approaching, etc. The concept of a ranking of control 
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spaces motivating demonstrative form selection resembles a description of 
demonstratives in terms of a control cycle (Brovold & Grush, 2012; Langacker, 2002). 
The proposal here differs from the control cycle, which does not address languages with 
more than two demonstrative forms and treats control as a categorical property. The 
current proposal instead includes an array of ranked control spaces, with correlated 
forms, in order to accommodate languages, such as Japanese, with more than two 
demonstrative forms. 
 The concept of control spaces led to three hypotheses that were considered here. 
To evaluate the hypotheses, ERP studies were conducted that simultaneously presented 
visual scenes of a virtual world environment that included a male figure, a female figure, 
and a referent object with an auditory stimulus that included a demonstrative expression. 
Participants were asked to decide if the presented audio-visual scenes formed congruent 
pairings of visual context with an expected demonstrative form or incongruent pairings. 
Participants’ judgments and reaction times were collected, and the EEG signal was 
averaged over each condition to yield the event-related potentials (ERPs). In light of the 
previous literature on semantic anomaly and surprising contexts, we expected that 
incongruent visual-audio pairings would elicit an N400 component, a negative waveform 
deflection at about 400 ms after the stimulus. 
Since languages have different divisions of control spaces and associated forms, 
we would hypothesize that language users would depend on extra-linguistic information, 
such as in form as a pointing gesture, according to such properties of their individual 
language as the number of demonstrative forms. This claim extrapolates from the 
Mutually Adaptive Modalities Hypothesis, which views language and gesture to be used 
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in compensatory concert for the sake of effective communication (De Ruiter, 2006; 
Melinger & Levelt, 2005). The hypothesis of the individual language affecting reliance 
on gesture use was borne out by the ERP study. In the setting of an incongruent pairing of 
a demonstrative expression and a visual context that does not include an accompanying 
pointing gesture, the English subject group showed a late positive deflection in the ERP 
analysis that is understood to represent a P600 form, an ERP component observed in 
several settings that show a structural violation in the stimulus pattern (Hagoort et al., 
1993, 1999; Osterhout & Holcomb, 1992; Schlesewsky & Bornkessel, 2006; Van Herten 
et al., 2006). The finding of cross-linguistic variation in response to a demonstration 
without gesture may suggest that English speakers rely more considerably on extra-
linguistic cues to interpret a reference. The ERP results support a view that individual 
languages function differently in combination with other tools of communication. 
A second hypothesis, with a nod toward the traditional distance-based model of 
demonstrative use, claims that relative distance of the referent object to the speaker and 
hearer will affect form selection, because different action possibilities will be estimated 
for discourse participants on the basis of how far they are from the object. Behavioral 
data strongly confirmed the view that distance affects demonstrative form selection in 
both English and Japanese. Participants conformed to this expectation in their 
acceptability judgments, and reaction times support the view that the congruency of a 
demonstrative form and a visual context depended on the relative distances of the referent 
to the speaker and hearer. The ERP data corroborated the hypothesis, as well, as visual 
contexts that included a pointing gesture provoked a late negative deflection in the 
waveform when the verbal stimulus did not coincide with the expected distances between 
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interlocutors and referent. The negative waveform deflection is interpreted here to be 
akin to the N400 component observed in studies that presented stimuli with odd contexts 
(Osterhout, Allen, Mclaughlin, & Inoue, 2002; Brown & Hagoort, 1993; Kutas & 
Federmeier, 2011; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980, 1984). 
Another hypothesis qualifies the second, as relative distance is expected to be less 
important in form selection if the hearer does not share the speaker’s gaze. Giving 
credence to the role of attention in demonstrative selection, the ERP data did not reveal 
an N400 effect when the hearer’s gaze was turned elsewhere but did show an N400 if the 
speaker and hearer were attending in the same direction. The importance of gaze has 
clear ramifications in terms of the function of demonstrative forms. Attentional models 
(e.g, Fitzgerald, 1966; Kirsner & van Heuven, 1988; Strauss, 1993, 2002) stressed the 
role of certain forms, e.g. “this,” to signal high focus. According to Strauss (2002), the 
so-called proximal form in fact signals a referent of high importance to the speaker and 
new information to the hearer. The data from this project support a role for attention, for 
which the hearer’s gaze served as a proxy. When the hearer is not attending in the same 
direction as the speaker, the speaker would likely assess fewer action possibilities 
between the hearer and the referent at that moment, even if the referent is physically 
nearer the hearer.       
What unifies both the hypotheses and results from the experiments discussed 
above is an approach to word selection in referring to an object that implies how the 
speaker plans to interact with the object. I suggest that the proposed approach offers a 
more grounded account for language use, such that conceptual divisions between 
proximal and distal demonstrative forms are derived from the interaction of the language 
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users’ bodies with their environment. The proposal here seeks to explain demonstration 
in language as an example of embodied cognition, such that interpretation of the world 
depends on the subject’s own condition. To the extent that an individual has tendencies to 
interact with the environment, an assessment of control of that environment ensues. 
Demonstratives are argued here to identify one’s potential actions toward an object by 
means of contrastive lexical items that co-occur with extra-linguistic cues. The 
incorporation of non-verbal communication establishes a relationship between mature 
language use and non-human animal communication, as well as child language 
acquisition. We have suggested and provided evidence for the claim that the richness of a 
language’s demonstrative system affects language users’ dependence on physical cues, a 
conclusion consistent with the Mutually Adaptive Modalities Hypothesis (De Ruiter, 
2006; Melinger & Levelt, 2005). 
 There are several ways to extend the argument. As mentioned earlier, there are 
languages with a similar number of demonstrative forms as English (e.g., Chinese) or 
Japanese (e.g., Spanish) that would be expected to show differences in the use of such 
forms. There are languages such as Malagasy that include many more demonstrative 
forms than English. There are languages, such as French, where the deictic element of 
demonstratives can be dropped. That is, to refer to this cup or that cup in French, one can 
say “cette tasse-cì” or “cette tasse-là,” respectively, yet the final morpheme can be 
omitted. To what extent this would affect French speakers’ reliance on extra-linguistic 
cues differently than the previously discussed languages would be informative.  
Another extension of control spaces would be in the temporal use of 
demonstratives. The demonstrative “this” is used to refer either the present or the near 
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future, whereas “that” can be used for other views of time, such as toward the past, e.g., 
(34). 
 
(34)   a. Back when I met your dad, he was always talking about deep sea fishing during 
the summer. Does he actually do that? 
b. That summer, yes, to a fault, but definitely not this summer. 
b’. This summer, yes, to a fault, but definitely not that summer. 
 
The use of “this” in (34) is understood to refer to a present summer or one soon to arrive, 
no matter the order of presentation, that is, (34b) or (34b’). This interpretation can be 
explained as an extension of control space to the description of time. No matter a 
speaker’s power of nostalgia, one has more possible actions available toward the future 
than the past. 
A fuller understanding of demonstratives would benefit from developmental 
research. Young children have been shown to not easily take other individuals’ 
perspectives (de Villiers & de Villiers, 1974; Rodrigo et al., 2004), yet non-egocentrism 
does not seem to be a requirement of mature use of “this” and “that” according to 
experimental data (Webb & Abrahamson, 1976). Children might not show any 
differences in ERP data in the interpretation of demonstrative use.  Alternatively, the 
congruency effect in children might in fact be stronger than in adults, as children may 
apply more rigid rules in evaluating demonstratives than adults (Landry & Loveland, 
1989). As mentioned in Chapter 2, children developmentally learn to demonstrate an 
object by releasing direct control over an object. Further work on this subject would 
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therefore expect children to over-generalize one demonstrative form in a language and 
develop the mature distribution in tandem with their delayed recognition of social cues. 
Children would similarly be expected to develop language-specific spatial terms in 
conjunction with their physical capacity to interact with their environment more fully. 
Clinical applications for the present project may include therapies for individuals 
who may differ from normative behavior in terms of their capacity to understand others’ 
perspectives. Two populations that may show a deficit in reading the intended actions in 
others include those on the autism spectrum (Hobson, García-Pérez, & Lee, 2010; 
Kanner, 1943; Landry & Loveland, 1989) and those with schizophrenia (Brüne, 2003; 
Corcoran, Mercer, & Frith, 1995). Individuals with autism and schizophrenia are at 
special risk to misinterpret communicative gestures. Joint attention serves as a prognostic 
indicator of language acquisition in the autistic population (Bruinsma, Koegel, & Koegel, 
2004). Gaze tracking and joint attention have been associated with higher-level domain-
general meta-representation and executive function (Stone & Gerrans, 2006). Therapeutic 
techniques that incorporate a speaker’s use of control spaces in referential language may 
benefit individuals who may be challenged with reference resolution, abstract 
representation, and indeed interpreting others’ body language.  
A larger question that this topic approaches is the capacity for different 
individuals to analyze the social dynamic of a communicative context. The control space 
framework is built upon the premise that cognition develops in relation to one’s 
interaction with the environment. A specific prediction for populations that may differ in 
their capacity for social interpretation, e.g., autistic individuals, is that these persons 
would be expected to develop improved mastery over demonstrative distribution in 
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proportion to their own physical skills. It has already been reported that many physical 
skills are developed through imitation. Thus, those individuals who are better able to 
interact physically with their surroundings would be likely to benefit more from 
imitation. By learning the affordances of their environment, these individuals would more 
readily acquire mature demonstrative use, if not broader principles of linguistic 
expression as applied to a dynamic context. If the above prediction were borne out by 
experiment, then a therapeutic intervention for communicative skills in autistic 
individuals would be to encourage physical skills development through imitation.  
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